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NOTES
Search and Seizure of the Media:
A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and
First Amendment Analysis
On the evening of October io, 1974, police appeared at radio station
KPFK-FM in Los Angeles with a warrant authorizing them to search the
premises for a New World Liberation Front (NWLF) "communique"
that took credit for a recent bombing.' The officers conducted an intensive 8-hour search-combing files, listening to tapes, and looking through
reporters' notes- finally concluding that the NWLF letter was not at the
station.2 The KPFK search warrant was one of six that California law enforcement officials have executed at press offices since 1972.' The circumstances surrounding the incident illustrate the rationale behind the recent
development of the search technique.
For several years before the KPFK search, the news media had litigated
their right not to honor subpoenas from government investigatory bodies
x. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 7 PREss CENsoRSmP NEWSLETTER
[hereinafter cited as PCN] 11-12 (1975); 6 PCN 30 (1975), supra.
2. See 7 PCN 11-12 (1975), 6 PCN 30 (1975),supra note I.
3. See 7 PCN 11-1= (1975), 6 PCN 30 (1975), 5 PCN 33 (1974), 4 PCN 25--26 (1974), 2

PCN 14 (1973), supra note x. The press facilities searched include two affiliates of the Pacifica
Radio Network, KPFA-FM in Berkeley and KPFK-FM in Los Angeles, and a self-styled "Third
World inner city community station" in San Francisco, KPOO-FM. In addition, police searched
the offices of the Los Angeles Star and the Stanford Daily, the former a sexually explicit tabloid, the
latter the undergraduate-edited newspaper at Stanford University, and twice searched the Berkeley
Barb, an underground newspaper. All these events occurred in 1974 except the 1973 KPFA-FM
search and the Stanford Daily search in 1971. Also note the unsuccessful attempt of the Los Angeles
FreePress in 1 9 7 4 to obtain an injunction against an expected police search to recover a "communique"
from a radical group claiming responsibility for a bombing. 7 PCN 12 (1975), supra note i. All of
these searches were directed at politically dissident "underground" and college media in order to
obtain photographs of or original "communiques" taking responsibility for the allegedly criminal
activity of political dissidents. For example, the Stanford Daily warrant named unpublished photographs of a clash between the police and demonstrators protesting minority hiring policies at Stanford
University Hospital. The KPFK-FM search warrant directed the seizure of the original "New
World Liberation Front Communique." Furthermore, lawyer and CBS reporter Fred Graham
asserts that many police actions against the less established press probably go unreported and unlitigated. To illustrate, he cites an unpublicized warrantless search by local police in 1969 of the
office of the San Diego Street Journal. Graham explains the all-day search which left the office
in shambles as in retaliation for the paper's criticism of certain local banking interests. Graham,
Background Paper, in TwENTsxrs CENTURY FUND, TASK FopcE ON THm GOVERNMENT AND TH
PRES, REPORT: PRss FREnOsS UNnER PREssuRE 104 (1972). Although one court has ruled that

media searches (in fact any search of premises not occupied by a criminal suspect) are unconstitutional absent a showing that a subpoena would be impractical, see Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353

F. Supp. 124 (NJD. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 74-3212, 9 th Cir., Nov. 20, x974, noted in
86 H- v. L. REV. 1317 (1973) and 19 WA=NE ST. L. REv. 1653 (1973), California police have

ignored the holding of that case in the six subsequent searches noted supra.
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and courts. They premised claims of immunity from subpoenas on the first
amendment protection of newsgathering and on strengthened shield laws
for which they had lobbied." Indeed, when KPFK received the communique
from the NWLF, the station was in the process of litigating its previous
refusal to respect two subpoenas that sought production of communications
from other radical groups.' Reiterating the station's policy of not honoring
subpoenas prior to judicial challenge, station manager Will Lewis aired the
contents of the NWLF letter and offered typed copies of it to press and police, but refused to surrender the original.' Confident that a subpoena would
mean months of litigation, even if the courts eventually denied Lewis'
statutory and constitutional claims, the police resorted to the ex parte search
warrant process, allowing them to seize the evidence immediately, if found,
and litigate later, if necessary.7
This technique enabled the police more efficiently to vindicate the government's interests8 in the investigation and prosecution of crime as well as
its broader interest in a judicial dispute-solving mechanism capable of securing relevant information for the benefit of litigants generally-be they
the government, criminal defendants or civil litigants. There is reason to
expect that the modern trend toward more protective subpoena legislation
and a continued press willingness'-albeit with varying success""-to advance constitutional claims of immunity to subpoenas will encourage increasing police resort to the media search warrant' 2 in support of those
governmental goals.
While compatible with governmental interests in acquiring information
4. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345
(Ky. 1970).
5. See In re Lewis, 5o F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (i975).
6. See 7 PCN 1i-I2 (1975), 6 PCN 30 (1 9 75), supra note I.
7. California law enforcement officials admittedly developed the search technique to enable
rapid acquisition of information relating to criminal activity from uncooperative journalists. Brief
for Appellant at 25-28, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. x972), appeal
Nov. 20, 1974. More pointedly, The Reporters Committee for
docketed, No. 74-3212, 9th Cir.,
Freedom of the Press, 6 PO-N 30 (1975), supra note i, argues that the California police have used
the search procedure to avoid the increasing protectiveness of journalists' shield laws.
8. These interests are discussed more fully at notes 96-O4 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
io. See, e.g., In re Bensky, Misc. 75-18-OJC (N.D. Cal., filed April 14, 1975).
ii. Compare id. and Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. X972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 966 (1973), with Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (972).
12. Most third party searches require search warrants since none of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement will apply in that situation. See note 2o2 infra and accompanying text.
Consequenty this Note will only discuss warranted searches. In addition, the Note will not
focus on the judicial forum in which searches are most often challenged, i.e., the trial of
the person implicated by the seized evidence. Nor does it focus on the availability of suppression
and exclusion remedies, since the criminal defendant usually does not have standing to challenge
a third party search. See note i8o supra and accompanying text. Instead, this Note's attention is on
fora in which one not facing criminal trial may challenge past, and prevent future, uses of the
offending investigatory technique.
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about wrongdoing, media searches collide with important interests of journalists and their audiences. 3 This collision is also illustrated by the KPFK
incident. By exposing reporters' notes, files, and tapes to police scrutiny, the
KPFK search had the potential to duplicate the harmful effects on the obtaining of information from confidential sources that underlie constitutional and statutory claims of press protection from subpoenas.'
By affording several police officers access to all parts of the station's
cramped quarters for 8 hours, the search also disrupted the physical operation of the press facility. Moreover, the search warrant authorized police
intrusion on KPFK's private premises, and because those premises were occupied by persons not implicated in the crime under investigation, arguably
they were surrounded by greater expectations of privacy from government
incursion.' Media searches, then, lie at the crossroads of crucial first and
fourth amendment interests.' This Note surveys that vital intersection,'"
through which also pass important societal interests in criminal investigation and judicial acquisition of knowledge, generally. The analysis turns
in Part II to a consideration of the best constitutional accommodation of the
colliding interests and in Part III concludes with a discussion of several alternative constitutional standards that would restrict or prohibit press
searches. But before undertaking a difficult constitutional balancing of competing interests, the Note examines the state shield laws. Legislators have
already completed the balancing of relevant interests in drafting these statutes, leaving only the question-considered in Part I-of their application
to searches and seizures.
13. These interests are discussed more fully at notes 8o-95 infra and accompanying text.
14. On the effects of subpoenas on newsgathering, see generally V. BLASI, PRESS SUBPOENAS:

AN Eiin'nucAL AN LEGAL ANALYSIS (1972).

15. In fact, the only judge yet to hear a constitutional challenge to a search warrant of a press
office, see Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 743212, 9 th Cir., Nov. 20, 1974, held that nonsuspects or "third parties" deserve greater protection from
searches than suspects. See notes 217-34 supra and accompanying text.
16. In the "pantheon" of constitutional freedoms, first amendment interests have traditionally
been accorded a "preferred position." Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1973); see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). Recently,
though, Professor Amsterdam argued powerfully for a similar emphasis on the public's interest in
freedom from government intrusion, reflected in the fourth amendment. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 377-78 (1974). Characterizing speech activity
as a "small albeit precious part of the lives of most citizens," he pointed out that even its fullest
protection leaves the police almost entirely "unfettered to deal as they please with most of us
most of the time." Id at 377-78. Actually, a nearly identical historical process culminated in the
inclusion of both the first and fourth amendments in the Bill of Rights. See N. LASSON, Tam HisTORY AND

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH A

ENDMENT TO Tam

UNITED STATES CONSTrIrrrION

24-25 (1970); L. LEw-, LEGACY OF SUPPREssION, FREEnoi oF SPEECH AND PREss IN EARLY
AmERiCAN HISTORY 10-13 (1960). See also note x63 infra and accompanying text.
17. First and fourth amendment issues also have surfaced recently in police searches for and

seizure of allegedly pornographic materials illegally held by the media. See note 244 infra. This
Note, however, deals only with situations in which the press itself is not implicated in the criminal
activity triggering the search.
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I. Ti- REPORTER'S STATUTORY SHIELD: PROTECTION FROM SEARCH
AND SEIZURE

A. The Statutory Approach
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 8 the Supreme Court rejected broad constitu-

tional insulation of the press from subpoenas and suggested that protection
should come instead from state shield laws." In the wake of Branzburg,
courts have developed only tentative and qualified constitutional protections, while many state legislatures have provided more nearly absolute
statutory immunity from media subpoenas." Statutes in over half of the
states afford some protection to the journalist, typically using a testimonial
privilege format that relieves the journalist from compulsory testimony
about a source of information." About half of the statutes qualify that privilege with balancing standards of varying strictness or deny it in libel cases."
The modern trend expands the testimonial protection to the information
18. 408 U.S. 665 (1972)ig. Id. at 7o6: "There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to
the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas." Despairing of finding
much press protection from subpoenas in state shield laws, commentators usually advocate a more
uniform and absolute constitutional privilege. Compare 51 N.C.L. Ray. 1550, 1555-56 (1973), with
Comment, Newsmen's Privilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in
Jeopardy, 49 Tt.. L. RaV. 417, 436-38 (1975).
2o. The most current comparative analysis of state reporters' shield laws, discussing all but one
of the laws, can be found in Comment, supra note ig. The newest shield law, OXLA. STAT. Am. tit.
12, § 385.1-3 (Supp. 1975), brings to 26 the number of states with shield laws, an increase of io
since 1970. Currently no journalists' privilege exists in the federal courts, although the Department
of Justice has issued guidelines regulating requests for the issuance of subpoenas by its employees. Department of Justice Order 544-73, 28 C.F.R. § 5o.2o (1975). The guidelines require United States
Attorneys, with the approval of the Attorney General, to seek information elsewhere before approaching the press and to use subpoenas only if the public interest in disclosure outweighs its interest in
dissemination of news. The failure to adhere to the guidelines is no defense to a subpoena. See In re
Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1972). However, Attorney General Levi recently told federal
prosecutors that he will strictly enforce the regulations. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 20, 1975, at
6, col. i. In addition, for the past few years Congress has been wrestling with various versions of a federal shield law, but none has passed or seems likely to, partially because of a lack of widespread media
support for any one bill. See, e.g., H.R. 215, 9 4th Cong., ist Sess. (1975); cf. Graham & Landau, The
Federal Shield Law We Need, CoLna. JoouRNAtLIssvm REv., Mar./Apr. 1973, at 26.
22. See, e.g., Ky. Ray. STAT. Ams. § 421.100 (1974): "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before
the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any
committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or
by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he
is connected."
22. Compare ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (2964) (disclosure not privileged if it relates to information "published or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of the public
welfare"), with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51 § 1i6 (Supp. 1976) (divestiture of the privilege upon judicial
consideration of "the nature of the proceedings, the merits of the claim or defense, the adequacy
of the remedy otherwise available, if any, the relevancy of the source, and the possibility of establishing
by other means that which it is alleged the source requested will tend to prove"). The criticism
that state statutes provide insufficient protection of first amendment interests because of their
qualifications should be discounted in light of the limited scope of many of the qualifications.
But see Comment, supra note i9, at 434-38.
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itself.2 3 Most statutes broadly define the proceedings in which or authorities
from whom the journalist is protected from compulsory testimony. 2

The state shield statutes reflect legislative determinations that to one
degree or another press interests in newsgathering free of government intrusion should prevail over society's interest in obtaining evidence for use
by criminal investigators and the courts." That determination obviates the
need for intricate constitutional balancing of competing interests. In addition, the statutes reflect that determination in clear-cut standards for applying the evidentiary privilege to the press, in contrast to judicial balancing
in this area which often creates standards of uncertain application. 6 When
the courts provide such equivocal protection, confidential news sources may
feel no more secure in providing information than if there were no protection. Consequently, if the statutes apply to searches, they provide the
best front-line defense for the press against government demands for information.
Statutes designed to regulate testimony might not suggest themselves as
vehicles for controlling police search warrant procedures, and none of the
23. See Comment, supra note 19, at 431-32. It reports that eight statutes protect information,
as well as the source, from disclosure, seven of which were passed in 1973. Actually, II of the statutes
reviewed there included some protection of information as well as sources. See MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.945(l) (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1975) (as interpreted in In re Taylor, 412
Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (x963)); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.-3 (Supp. 1975). Of
those, eight were passed in 1973; since then two more states have included information within their
shield laws' protection. CAL. EVID. CoDE § 1070 (West 1966), as amended, CAL. Evm. CODE §
1070(c) (West Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 385.1-3 (Supp. 1975).
24. See, e.g., MIm. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (Supp. 1976) (no mandatory disclosure before "any
court, grand jury, agency, department or branch of the state, or any of its political subdivisions or
other public body, or by either house of the legislature or any committee, officer, member, or employee thereof . . ."). See also Comment, supra note i9, at 433-34.
25. See notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text.

26. Compare Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), with id. at 71o (Powell, J., concurring),
and Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1973).
27. See Murasky, Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TExAs L. REV. 89, 916 (1973). But see
Comment, supra note 19, at 436-38. Ms. Murasky levels similar criticism at the statutes because they
lack uniformity and thereby provide no guidance to newspersons and their sources as to what is
protected. However, lack of uniformity need not destroy certainty. Insofar as reporters know the law
of the states in which they work, they should at least know the scope of protection available in that
state's courts. See generally Cades, The Power of the Courts to Protect Journaliste Confidential
Sources of Information: An Examination of Proposed Shield Legislation, II HAwAi B.J. 35. 44
(1975). The proliferation of shield legislation explains the decided decline in the number and success of government press subpoenas seeking the name of sources of information, a phenomenon
that has puzzled some commentators. See Goodale, Subpoenas of News Reporters to Compel Disclosure of Confidential Information: An Analysis of Recent Legal Developments, 49 Los ANGELEs
B. BULL. 133,14

(1974)-

28. No appellate court has yet passed upon the applicability of a shield law--or most other

testimonial privileges-to the search and seizure of a press office. However, some courts have refused
to apply the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to searches and seizures. See 8 J.
WIoMOtE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (McNaughton rev. i96i). Wigmore supported this position because he

felt the privilege should be invoked only to relieve the individual of the dilemma between selfpreservation and morally required self-incrimination. A subpoena establishes a "moral responsibility
for truthtelling;" an involuntary search does not. Therefore, he argued, the privilege should not
apply to the latter. Note, however, that at least two federal circuit courts of appeals have held that
the government may not use search and seizure to obtain documents which, if subpoenaed, would be
subject to the self-incrimination privilege. Rather than the "moral responsibility" distinction upon
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statutes specifically includes search warrant restrictions. On the other hand,
searches of media offices for evidence of crimes not committed by the press
are a modern invention, the first one on record occurring in I971. Police
ingenuity in developing such new investigative procedures exceeds legislative ingenuity in predicting their development. Courts traditionally utilize
policy and legislative intent, as well as construction of statutory language,
to fill the gaps in the legislative imagination of future contingencies. This
section of the Note borrows those judicial tools to examine the scope of the
shield laws' applicability in the search and seizure context.
B. The Testimonial Shield Applied to Search and Seizure
Section io7o of the California Evidence Code" presents avaluable model
for discussing the application of state shield laws to searches and seizures
because California officials have pioneered the use of press searches in the
face of the statute's emphatically broad protections. Section Io7o immunizes
employees of periodicals, press associations, wire services, and the broadcast
media from contempt charges based on any journalises refusal to respond
to a subpoena demanding disclosure of unpublished information. 0 The
statute covers all information, including the names of sources, obtained
in the process of gathering news for publication. 1 Finally, section io7o
reflects the modern trend toward protection both of information and
which Wigmore focuses, the opinions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that the fifth
amendment prohibits all compulsory process used to seek production of incriminatory information
and have found the prohibited compulsion in both the search and subpoena situations. See Shaffer
v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 554, 560-62 (D. Colo. I974), af'd, 523 F.2d 175 (ioth Cir. x975), discussing the disagreement among the circuits on this point. Even if the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in the search situation, its distinct policy and background distinguish it from
other testimonial privileges protecting confidential communications. See C. McCoamcs, HANDBOos
ON TmE LAw oF EVImENCE § 140, at 298-99 (2d ed. 1972).
29. CAL.EvID. CoDa § 1070 (West Supp. 1976). Section I07o
reads as follows: "(a) A publisher,
editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body,
or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as
defined in Section 9o, the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for
publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information
for communication to the public.
"(b) Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or employed by
a radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged in
contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for news or news commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information
for communication to the public.
"(c) As used in this section, 'unpublished information' includes information not disseminated to
the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related information has been
disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other
data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication,
whether or not published information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated."
30. Id.
31. Id.

PRESS SEARCHES
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sources, 32 and its successive amendments provide a clear exposition of the

legislature's intent."s
i. Mechanicalapplication.
Facially, section 1070 seems to cover the search situation. The statute
applies if contempt citations might issue from one of several bodies with

subpoena powers when a member of the press refuses to disclose information in certain proceedings. Evidence Code section 9O1 defines those pro-

ceedings as an "action, hearing, investigation, inquest or inquiry (whether
conducted by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator,

legislative body, or other person authorized by law) in which, pursuant
to law, testimony can be compelled to be given." ' All the major elements
-enforcement

by contempt citation, issuance by agencies with subpoena

power, use in particular proceedings-appear analogously in the search
and seizure context. The penalty for resisting the execution of a search
warrant is a criminal contempt citation." A magistrate with the power

to issue search warrants also has subpoena powers."6 Furthermore, successfully barring the door to a search is a refusal to disclose information in
an investigation authorized by law.
Most shield statutes go beyond immunizing the reporter from contempt
and protect him from compulsory disclosures at the behest of enumerated
officials or investigatory bodies." Under a mechanistic interpretation, these
statutes forbid the police-acting either as statutorily enumerated officials
or as their agents-from compelling journalists to disclose information.
2. Policy and legislativeintent.

The mechanical fit of searches in the language of the shield laws is no
accident. While generally written with subpoenas in mind, the statutes reflect legislators' intent to enact a policy protecting the press from government investigatory interference.
Id.; see Comment, supra note 1g, at 434.
33. See notes 38-42 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the provision's history.
While among the more protective shield laws, § X070 is not totally unqualified. The California provision, like N.Y. Crv. sGHrrs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1975), but unlike most other shield
legislation, is less protective in that it is not a testimonial privilege but rather an immunity from
contempt. This distinction has consequences for the journalist-litigant who faces other sanctions than
contempt, e.g., a default judgment in a libel suit for refusing to testify. Cf. Bramson v. Wilkerson,
3 Cal. Disc. Proc. 72 (Super. Ct. x962). In addition, the bar to contempt does not apply in a federal
diversity case, unlike true privileges. Fm. R. Evm. 5ox; see Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.,
66 F.A.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
34. CAL. Evm. CODE § 901 (West 1970).
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 166(4-5), 724 (West 1970).
36. See CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. §§ 1986(1), 1986(3), 2093 (West 1955) (defining the purposes
of subpoenas and judicial officers who may issue them); CAL. PENAL CoD §§ 8o8, 1523 (West 1970)
(identifying judicial officers who may issue search warrants).
37. By far the most common language provides that the reporter may not "be compelled to
testify or disclose" certain information. See, e.g., Aauz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1975).
32.
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In 1964, the California Law Revision Commission undertook a study
of the predecessor"8 of section Io7o. The Commission concluded that the
provision afforded "a carte blanche grant of an absolute and unqualified
immunity to newsmen to refuse to disclose the source of any information
procured for and used in the protected news media." 9 The Commission
proposed that the absoluteness of the privilege should be tempered by allowing the courts some discretion to deny it.4" Instead, however, the California
lawmakers since 1964 thrice have increased the statute's protection of the
press, extending the range of journalists, proceedings, and information to
which it applies." More than before, the section now reflects what the California Law Revision Commission in 1964 called "a legislative determination that the public interest is best served by nondisclosure in every situation. 4
In a long preamble to its shield statute, the Nebraska legislature exCODE Civ. PRO. § I88I(6) (West 1955), as recodified and amended, CAL. Evm. CODE
(West 1974).
39. CAL. LAw REv. COMM'N, 6 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STuruInS 484 (1964).
40. Id. at 5o5.
41. In 1971, the provision was widened to include former as well as current journalists. This
was done in direct response to a court's threatened overly narrow interpretation. A former newspaper
reporter was adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose to a court the source of an information leak
during the Manson trial. At the time, § I07o applied only to "journalists employed upon a newspaper." While deciding the case against the ex-reporter on other grounds, the court opined that
"[s]ection I07o read strictly does not include petitioner within the scope of its immunity." Farr v.
Superior COurt, 2.2 Cal. App. 3d 6o, 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (2d Dist. I97i), cert. denied, 409
U.S. IozI (3972); the same year the legislature rejected that strict interpretation. A bill was passed
extending § 1070's protection to information procured by "any person who has been . . . connected [with] or employed" by the press. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West 1972). The provision
was widened again in 1972 by adding immunity from subpoena by "any other body having the power
to issue subpoenas." CAL. EVID. CODE § 3070 (West 3973). The legislature apparently assumed that
the successive revisions had made the privilege absolute in all local and state legislative, investigative
and administrative proceedings. In 1974 the California Legislature once again amended § 107o against
the backdrop of the minute examination of shield laws occurring in the courts and the literature in
the early 1970s. In 1973, for example, a commentator published an extensive analysis of the California
shield law. See Comment, Newsman's Privilege: A Survey of the Law in California, 4 PAC. L.J. 88o
(1973). The author found the law "virtually an absolute privilege" except for some ambiguous language susceptible to probably erroneous narrow judicial interpretation. Id. at 9O3. The author suggested three such areas: whether "source" included the news itself as well as the informer, whether
magazine employees were protected, and whether prior dissemination of part of the information
gathered waived a privilege as to the rest. Id. These questions and others had also been raised concerning § 1070 and similar shield laws in cases around the country. On the interpretation of "source,"
compare In re Taylor, 432 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 383 (3963) ("source" includes "information"), with
State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d i8 (3967) (criticizing Taylor in dicta), and Forest Hills
Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 302 N.E.ad 593 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 3973); on the press publications covered,
see Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (diversity suit interpreting the California statute at that time not to include magazine reporters within "newspaper reporter"); on the
waiver question, see People v. Wolf, 39 App. Div. 2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
3972) (publication of an edited article waives a privilege as to the unedited version). The California
legislators' 1974 amendment of § 3070 expressed a dear opinion as to how they meant to resolve
the ambiguity which these judges and scholars had discovered in shield laws. They filled every
imagined loophole in the protections of the press so that the ingenuity of judges and government
investigative bodies would no longer defeat their protective intent.
42. 6 REPoRTs, supra note 39, at 502. See COmment, CriminalProcedure;Newsmen's Immunity
from Contempt, 4 PAC. L.J., 387, 388 (1973).
43. NzE. STAT. ANN. § 20-144 (974): "The Legislature finds: (I) That the policy of the
State of Nebraska is to insure the free flow of news and other information to the public, and that
those who gather, write, or edit information for the public or disseminate information to the public

38. CAL.

§ 1070

May 1976 ]

PRESS SEARCHES

plained what public interests are best served by nondisclosure of press information in government investigations. The legislators noted that forcing
journalists to disclose information or its source "inhibits the free flow of
information to the public."" The preamble therefore defines it as Nebraska
policy to encourage newsgathering and dissemination free of direct or indirect restraint "imposed by governmental process.""5
Because both the search warrant and the subpoena are "governmental
process" compelling disclosure of information before an investigative agency, both are equally condemned by the shield laws' policy. Police scrutiny of
files containing information provided by confidential sources inhibits those
sources and thus the "free flow of information to the public" no less than
production of those files before a secret grand jury, to which the statutes
clearly apply." Moreover, because the history and language of many of
the statutes, like California's, reflect a legislative resolution to protect all
journalists from compulsory disclosure at the behest of all governmental
officials,4" the statutes should apply to police executing search warrants
against the media as well as to prosecutors, grand juries, judges, and legislators issuing subpoenas to them.
A distinguished judicial tradition favors a narrow interpretation of all
testimonial privileges, including shield statutes,4" because they violate the
maxim that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." 9 However,
legislators apply that policy to benefit government agencies by according
them the subpoena power." Lawmakers, however, have traditionally withheld the subpoena power from most executive law enforcement officials and
all police officers, deeming them incompetent to utilize the power judiciously." Shield statutes should not be read to permit the police to procure informay perform these vital functions only in a free and unfettered atmosphere; (2) That such persons
shall not be inhibited, directly or indirectly, by governmental restraint or sanction imposed by governmental process, but rather that they shall be encouraged to gather, write, edit, or disseminate news
or other information vigorously so that the public may be fully informed; (3) That compelling such
persons to disclose a source of information or disclose unpublished information is contrary to the
public interest and inhibits the free flow of information to the public; (4) That there is an urgent
need to provide effective measures to halt and prevent this inhibition....
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See notes 192-99 infra and accompanying text, arguing that the search procedure actually
more drastically inhibits confidential sources than the subpoena.
47. The California provision describes the governmental agencies before which a newsperson
may refuse to testify no more broadly than most other states' statutes. See, e.g., note 24 supra. Some
statutes actually apply more explicitly than California's to the police. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1-12.X(B)(i) (Supp. 5975) ("includes any proceeding or investigation before, or by, any
legislative, judicial, executive or administrative body or person").
48. See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 28, at § 2192.
49. Id., paraphrasing Sir Francis Bacon in the Countess of Shrewsbury's Trial, 2 Howell's St.
Trials 769, 778 (162). See C. McConcsx, supra note 28, at § 77.
5o. This is Wigmore's conclusion. 8 J. WIoAoRa, supranote 28, at §§ 2599(i-fi), 2194(a), 2200;
accord,People v. Gonzales, 2o Cal. 2d 165, 571, 124 P. 2d 44, 47 (942).
euaK,
supra note 28, § 137, at 29o, indicating that the general tendency is
51. See C. McCo
not to give law enforcement officials the subpoena power. But note Delaware's statutory grant to the
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mation when they deny that privilege to other agencies that are usually more
favored in evidence gathering.52 In fact, the traditionally narrow reading
of these statutes, premised on their contravention of the important public
policy favoring provision of evidence before certain agencies, is inappropriate in the search context,s since that policy has never favored police
evidence procurement. 4
Attorney General of subpoena powers coextensive with those constitutionally allowed the grand jury.
See In re Hawkins, 5o Del. 61, 123 A.2d 113 (1956). Note, however, that state's requirement that
such subpoenas, to be valid, must not extend the "statutory and historical scope" of the subpoena power
to "transform its original grand jury function into a police instrumentality." In re McGowen, 303
A.2d 645, 647 (Del. '973).
52. The exclusionary rule, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), does keep some illegally
seized information from the courts that the police may obtain. But see United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974) which allows grand juries to utilize such evidence. Nonetheless, all seizures to
which the exclusionary rule applies are illegal; the law does not authorize their use by any government officials. Modern criticism, in fact, condemns the suppression rule because its exclusionary
impact falls on the courts, rather than the police, despite society's traditional desire to have the courts
utilize all relevant information available to them. See generally Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 14 Am. U.L. Rav. i (1964); Schrock & Welch, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as
a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 289-95 (1974). Thus even given the vagaries

of the exclusionary rule, society nowhere authorizes greater police access to information than courts,
grand juries and legislators have. And by giving the police less access to information than other
agencies, since police are not accorded the subpoena power, the law belies any elaim that society at
times has a greater interest in police access than it does in agencies' access.
53. Both the policy behind the shield laws and their passage by legislatures in the face of the
traditionally strong judicial policy against privileges, promotes expansive interpretation in all situations. Accord, In re Taylor, 412, Pa. 32, 40, 193 A.2d x81, 185-86 (1963). See also C. McCoaiemc,
supra note 28, § 1i8, at 253, arguing in favor of a testimonial privilege (in this case, against selfincrimination) to cushion the impact of government investigations on free expression. The "strong
public policy in favor of the protection of certain communications" leads courts to apply evidentiary
privileges where conflict of laws rules would otherwise not permit. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp.
465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (applying California's shield law to a deposition taken in New York,
though in a suit filed in the former state); see Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (i973) (federal question proceeding in which the shield laws
in the relevant states did not control but were accorded persuasive weight by Chief Judge Kaufman
as expressions of "a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters . . ").
Insofar as the modern trend has been toward extension of the statutes and especially insofar as some
of those extensions have been direct responses to judicial and academic attempts to read the statutes
narrowly, the legislative history of the statutes argues for broad interpretation. Section 1070's legislative history, consistent with the provisos in the previous sentence, is discussed in note 41 supra. See
also, for example, changes in New Jersey's law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-2i (1976), formerly
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-Io, which extended protection in 196o to the "means" by which, as well
as the source from whom, the information was obtained, clearing up an ambiguity noted in State v.
Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 486-87, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (1943). Similarly, amendments to the New
York law, N.Y. Civ. RIosrrs LAw § 79-h(8)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970), explicitly forbade grand
juries from seeking contempt citations against journalists for refusing to disclose information-protection only implicitly within the unamended statute. Some of the newer laws enacted in the wake of
the national controversy over the rights of reporters with respect to government demands for evidence
include strong statements of purpose or intent concerning many of the controversial areas of interpretation. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-i-2.1 (A) (Supp. 1975); note 43 supra.
54. A contrary reading would allow seizure of tangible items that could thereafter not properly
be entered into evidence absent the authentication that the journalist, pursuant to the shield, may
refuse to make. An interpretation of the shield law not to limit press searches would allow the police,
for example, to seize a "Symbionese Liberation Army" communique and find fingerprints on it
leading to a suspect, all of which a grand jury, not bound by most rules of evidence, could use to
indict. But the linkage of the document to the suspect at the subsequent trial may be impossible
without authentication by the searched newsperson who could refuse to testify by invoking a shield
law. See Transcript Rulings Before Judge Avakian, at 34, In re Death of Marcus Foster (Super. Ct.
Dep't i, March 28, 1974) (involving a case similar to this hypothetical in which a California court
applied California's shield law to prevent the reporter from having to testify and barred the evidence).
It is unlikely that the Legislature would authorize the police to obtain evidence that no other body
could make use of in the prosecution of crime. See note 52 supra.
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Clearly, journalists seeking protection from the execution of an expected

search warrant should first attempt to interpose the statutory shield between
themselves and the police. The language and policy of the statutes are
broad enough to provide the press with some shelter from searches. However, judicial extension of the statutes to search warrants only partially
protects journalists from searches. The next section discusses the breaches
in that protective shield.
C. Difficulties in the Application of Shield Laws to the Search Context
i.Limitationsin jurisdictionalapplicability.
Shield laws apply in only 26 states." With the exception of federal
prosecutors, bound by nonjudicially cognizable Justice Department guidelines," federal officials are free to procure evidence from the media to the
same extent they can from other citizens. While the shield laws do apply
in federal diversity cases, 7 they do not bind federal courts exercising federal
question jurisdiction."5 To the extent that a confidential source's information
might relate to activity that in turn might attract scrutiny from federal
officials, or from state officials unrestrained by one of the 26 laws, the source
will remain inhibited, despite the protection the statutes may afford in other
situations. Certainly the alleged multistate activities-including such federal
offenses as bank robbery"° and kidnapping"-of underground groups,
whose communications have traditionally triggered searches,"' will rarely
be completely immunized from governmental scrutiny by the 26 statutes.
2. Unprotectedjournalists.
Even if the statutes assure confidential sources that their information
will avoid the reach of government officials who are unconstrained by
shield statutes, sources still may be afraid to pass the information to reporters. In addition to the statutes' uncertain application to searches in general,
and their occasional use of broad balancing qualifications, some of them
also specifically exclude from protection " certain journalists,6 and certain
kinds of information. " Similarly, some courts interpret the statutes to
55. See note 2o supra.
56. See id.
57- See Fa. R. EvM. 501.
58. See In re Lewis, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

420 U.S. 913 (1975).

59. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113 (Supp. 1975).
6o. Id. § 12oI.

6z. See note 3 supra.
62. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
63. See generally Comment, supranote 19, at 429-36.
64. Some statutes potentially exclude "underground" papers by requiring that the press meet certain circulation and publication date requirements to be protected. See, e.g., INn. STAT. ANN. § 34-35-1 (Supp. 1975)-

65. The typical situation in which the police have used the search procedure concerns "communiques" from dissident political groups. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. The statutes
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require an explicit understanding of confidentiality between reporter and
source--an especially troublesome requirement with respect to "communiques" anonymously sent to press offices with the expectation of publication or broadcast. A few of the statutes also hold that partial publication or
broadcast waives the privilege as to unpublicized portions of confidential
communications." It should be noted, however, that broadly drawn statutes
-including, for example, section Io7o-may avoid all of these pitfalls."
are about evenly split as to whether only "sources" or all information is protected from disclosure.
See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Under the former type of provision, the argument that
the "communique" fits within the protected "source" would focus on the fact that the police want
the document for fingerprint, voice, background noise, and/or typewriter analysis, all leading to the
identification of its source. See, e.g., In re Bensky, Misc. 75-i8-OJC (N.D. Cal., filed April z5, 1975).
The courts generally take a liberal view in their interpretation of "source" to deny the government
access to information that would "directly" or "indirectly . . . identify or help to identify the
source of the communications," or have "any chilling effect on sources of information from the disclosure of this kind.
... Transcript Rulings Before Judge Avakian, at 42, In re Death of Marcus
Foster (Super. Ct. Dep't i, March 28, 1974); see Forest Hills Util. Co. v. Heath, 302 N.E.2d 593, 597
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1973).

66. New York courts in particular have insisted that the protected information must have been
"imparted to the reporter under a cloak of confidentiality, i.e., upon an understanding, express or
implied, that the information or its sources will not be disclosed ..
" People v. Wolf, 69 Misc.
2d 256, .26, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291, 297, af'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 864 (1972). In the "communique"
situation discussed supra note 65, one New York court suggested that the anonymity of a letter
signed only by the "Weather Underground" belies any confidential relationship between the recipient
radio station and the writer. WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1973).
The confidentiality requirement seems to come from the traditional but here less applicable requirement that information privileged from disclosure because of a need to protect some professional relationship must have been imparted in confidence. See 8 J. WIOMoRE, supra note 28, at § 2285. With
respect to testimonial privileges generally, the modern trend liberalizes this by requiring only a confidential intent, even if the communication was purloined or eavesdropped and thus not actually
confidential. C. McCoamcsr, supra note 28, at § 75. As the dissent in Proskin argued, the fact of
anonymity itself clearly manifests to the reporter the communicant's intent not to publicize at least
his name and perhaps part of the information. WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App. Div. 2d at 9-zo, 344
N.Y.S.2d at 397 (Cooke, J., dissenting). More broadly, the victims of searches are usually media
organizations that have established relationships of trust and confidence with radical organizations,
without which the information would not have been sent. For example, consider one searched radio
station in San Francisco, KPOO-FM, which announced a station policy not to act as a "police
information agency" after the "New World Liberation Front," the source of the "communique" that
was listed in the search warrant, demanded that the station not release anything it received from
the group. With respect to the journalists' privilege, the modern judicial trend has been to dispense
with the requirement of confidentiality entirely, since it has little applicability to the privilege's policy
of free flow of information to the public (rather than to a lawyer or doctor, for example). See
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Loadholtz v. Fields,
389 F. Supp. I299, 1302-03 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 724, 294 A.2d
149, 156 (Ct. Spec. App.), aff'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 95T
(1973) (explicitly rejecting the Wolf interpretation). But see In re Lewis, 501 F.2d 418, 422 (gth
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975). Actually the confidentiality requirement in New York,

not yet passed upon by the Court of Appeals, has been rejected by two New York lower courts.
Compare In re CBS (Sup. Ct. Ontario County, order filed June 25, 1971), and People v. Bonnakemper,
74 Misc. 2d 696, 345 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Rochester City Ct. 1973), with In re Dan, 8o 1Misc. 2d 399, 363
N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975). Some statutes include within their protection information clearly not
received under an explicit promise of confidentiality. E.g., CAL. Evm. CoDa, § 070(c) (West Supp.
1976).
67. In the "communique" situation, the group so communicating obviously intends that the
message, if not the medium, be aired. Under a few statutes, the broadcast or publication of that
message may waive the entire privilege. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-2I (West 1976), as
interpreted in In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991

('973)'
68. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976) requires that the information protected from
disclosure be "obtained" by the press. Niggardly judicial interpretation might find this language
insufficient to encompass the passive reception of a letter from a radical group. But see WBAI-FM v.
Proskin, 42 App. Div. 2d 5, 8, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (z973) (Cooke, J., dissenting): "[N]o logical
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3. The unwieldiness of the shield.
The most troublesome stage in the application of shield statutes to search
warrants occurs after the journalist has overcome the interpretive problems
discussed above. Assured that the legislation's shield should protect him,
the journalist must find a way to interpose it between himself and law
enforcement officials as rapidly as the latter can secure a search warrant and
execute it. Because the police obtain warrants in ex parte proceedings from
magistrates who may act as quickly as police can prepare affidavits, 9 the
journalist will have difficulty interceding at the procurement stage of the
warrant procedure. Very possibly the first notice the journalist will have of
the proposed search will be when the police are knocking at his door,
warrant in hand."0
Should he choose to oppose the warrant the journalist has two unsatisfactory options: immediate forceful resistance, or subsequent remedial
litigation. Forceful resistance by journalists is arguably irremedial since the
statute's immunization of reporters from legal compulsion, including contempt citations, for choosing nondisclosure removes the normal remedy for
resistance to process of court.' Nonetheless, if reporters, confident of the
statute's applicability, interpose themselves between their files and the police,
they invite the police to exercise their statutory power to brush resisters aside,
break down locked doors, and execute the warrant. 2 Accepting the inevitable-acquiescing in the search and initiating subsequent judicial action
-may afford journalists only slightly more protection. Police reliance even
on an illegal search warrant issued by a magistrate probably satisfies the
"good faith" or "pursuant to duty" defenses that immunize law enforcement officials from tort liability for damages. ' And even if the court enjoins
further searches and/or declares past ones illegal 4 -in fact, even if redistinction can be drawn between affirmatively gathered news and that received passively from other
sources." Arguably, the underground press' establishment of contacts with radical groups who then
forward information to these media organizations constitutes a process by which information is
actively obtained. See note 66 supra. Some statutes clearly encompass information that was merely
"delivered" to the press, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-2i (1976).
69. The mechanics of the search warrant process from issuance to execution are discussed at
notes 168-2ox infra and accompanying text.
70. This is not universally so. See, for example, the policy of some California reporters, anticipating searches, to inform police that items subject to searches will not be kept in their press
facility's offices. Cf. 6 PCN 30 (1975), supra note i. Note also the unsuccessful attempt of the
Los Angeles Free Press to secure an injunction against an expected search warrant. See 7 PON 12
(1975), supra note i. Note 75 infra discusses this incident in greater detail.
71. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., CAL. PaSaL CODE §§ 723, 1531, 1532 (West 1970). These statutes authorize a
public officer to raise a posse of "male inhabitants of his county" and if necessary to break down
doors to execute the warrant.
73. Given standing rules that deny the benefit of the exclusionary rule to criminal defendants
whoce property was not searched, the suppression remedy affords no protection to victims of
searches who are unimplicated in crime. See note x8o infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the remedies available to nonsuspect victims of illegal searches.
74. While denying injunctive relief following a police search of newspaper offices that it held
unconstitutional, one court issued a declaratory judgment concerning the warrant's illegality. See
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porters overcome the good faith defenses and receive monetary relief-the
damage precipitated by the search can hardly be undone. Sources whose
timidity inspired a desire for confidentiality will receive slight comfort
from these remedies awarded long after the police have rifled reporters'
files, read their notes, and listened to their tapes.
These caveats, however, need not deter journalists from pursuing statutory remedies. Once the courts-even in after-the-fact proceedings-clearly
apply the shield laws to the search situation, reporters can rely on magistrates
if not police to heed them.7 Judges eschew violence and would endeavor
to avoid even the abstract possibility that journalists, immune from legal
redress, might try to resist the forceful execution of a warrant.7 Moreover,
the more clearly unauthorized the search, the less certain the availability of
good faith defenses, and the greater the likelihood that police will forego
the warrant alternative."
D. Conclusion: the Applicability of State Shield Laws
to the Search Warrant
The shield laws permit newspersons to reject government demands for
news-related information in their possession. State legislatures have balanced the competing interests and in different forms and with various
qualifications have deemed certain press interests supreme. Solely with
reference to their language, it is probably fair to interpret many of the
statutes to afford a freedom from searches and seizures. And their underlying policy to erect a shield between the press and government intrusion
should immunize the media from producing evidence at the behest of
police executing warrants as well as at the command of other government
agencies issuing subpoenas. This conclusion is reinforced by the interpretive
environment surrounding the statutes, which calls for their liberal applicaStanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp.

124

(1972), appeal docketed, No. 74-33x2, 9th Cir.,

Nov. 2o, 1974.
75. In 1974, the Los Angeles Free Press received a communication from the New World Lib-

eration Front taking responsibility for a bombing. Mindful of the Los Angeles Police Department's
search of KPFK-FM earlier in the month, see note i supra and accompanying text, the newspaper
sought an injunction against the expected search warrant. The FreePress based its plea on the Stanford
Daily case. See note 74 supra; notes 217-34 infra and accompanying texts. The Los Angeles County
Superior Court denied the injunction, assuring the media that police and magistrates know and
presumably follow the law. See 7 PCN 12 (I975), supra note i, c. Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d
643, 646 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 990 (1971) (unnecessary to enjoin magis-

trates from issuing illegal warrants). To the extent that a state statute (as opposed to a federal district court's constitutional pronouncement, as in the Stanford Daily case) clearly barred a warrant,
the magistrates might be more likely to refuse to authorize one.
76. In a similar situation, one California judge, construing § 1070 to immunize a journalist for
contempt for refusing to testify, would not even order the journalist to do so. Transcript Rulings
Before Judge Avakian, at 42, In re Death of Marcus Foster (Super. Ct., Dep't i, March 28, 1974).
The judge stated that he would "not order somebody to answer a question when [he had] no means
of enforcing that order." Neither, presumably, would he issue a media search warrant, authorizing
violent execution of it, when he has no means of punishing a journalist's successful resistance to it;
much less would a court force the journalist to resist in order to invoke that protection.
77. But see note 75 supra.
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tion to agencies like the police that are not traditionally favored by society
with government evidence-gathering powers. However, especially in light
of the suspicion that the police have used searches to subvert the statute's
policy and because of the need to provide the clearest guidance to magistrates
and police, this Note recommends that legislatures remove shield laws'
ambiguity by explicitly extending them to searches.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE PRESS FROM SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

EXTENDING

Branzburg's GRAND JURY

SUBPOENA ANALYSIS TO

POLICE SEARCHES

In federal courts and in the states without shield laws, the press must
resort to the Constitution for protection from police searches. Even in those
states with shield laws, the constitutional argument remains an important
second line of protection, underscoring the policies behind the statutes."S
This Part will first identify the constitutionally recognized press and governmental interests at stake in official demands for information from the media.
It will consider how courts have balanced these interests in the wake of
Branzburg v. Hayes," a case concerning newspersons' constitutional privilege against disclosure of information in the face of grand jury subpoenas.
After extending those post-Branzburgformulations to police investigatory
intrusions on the press through search warrants, it will conclude that the
subpoena and warrant procedures differ substantially in their effect upon
press and governmental interests and require a different balancing of
those interests in the search and seizure context resulting in greater pro-

tection of the press from searches than that constitutionally available in the
subpoena context.
A. The Interests Involved in Search and Seizure of the Press
Although partisans in the press search debate most often characterize
the dispute as a simple confrontation between press freedoms and society's
need to protect itself from crime, other interests actually complicate the
controversy. This section will discuss four interests inevitably involved in
the press search controversy whose interrelationship determines the legal
limits of media searches.
i. Press interests.
Privacy of the press. The fourth amendment's guarantee that the people
shall "be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures ...""
78. State constitutions' free press provisions provide a potentially important third line of protection. See Falk, The State Contitution:A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALin. L.
REV. 273 (1973).
79. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
8o. U.S. Corsr. amend. IV.
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testifies to the framers' recognition that citizens' privacy should be protected against government intrusion."' Members of the press, like participants in other businesses, enjoy constitutionally protected expectations of
privacy concerning their private media facilities, as well as their homes."
Journalists also have personal files, memoranda, and numerous compilations of confidential information which they are constitutionally entitled
to shelter from governmental intrusion, even if the business institution
rather than the individual technically owns the items."
Significantly, searches of the press are typically "third party" searches,
that is, neither the journalists nor anyone else on the premises is suspected
of criminal activity. One court has suggested that nonsuspects enjoy more
potent expectations of privacy than persons implicated in criminal activity."While the search warrant currently affords the highest level of fourth
amendment protection from searches," its summary and ex parte issuance
by a magistrate applying a probable cause standard that is insufficiently
sensitive to special privacy interests may inadequately protect greater third
party interests in privacy."8
It is possible that with careful attention to the interests involved, the
fourth amendment alone would solve the third party search problem without recourse to special first amendment interests involved in third party
searches of the press." But this Note argues that the better course is to
8I. The most frequently cited Supreme Court reformulation of the fourth amendment states
that "wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' . . . he is entitled
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). For criticism of this standard, see Amsterdam, supra note i6, at 383. Modern constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that
governmental interference in intimate matters or private decisions may violate the fourth amendment even if accomplished by means other than unreasonable search and seizure. This line of interpretation of the fourth amendment forms only one aspect of a more general privacy right implicit in
the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (holding unconstitutional laws regulating the use of contraceptives because enforcing
them would unduly intrude upon the privacy of the "marital bedroom").
82. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351-52 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).

83. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 366-69 (1968); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543
(1967). If incorporated, the press facility also has a protected interest in freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924). However a corporation's interest in privacy may not loom so large as an individual's. See United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).

84. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 743312, 9 th Cir., Nov. 20, 1974. The court held that third party searches should only occur after the
police have satisfied the magistrate that a subpoena would not suffice. Since the same requirement does
not extend to searches of suspects' property, the court implies that persons implicated in crime have
lesser constitutionally protected expectations of privacy than unimplicated persons. See notes 217-34
infra and accompanying text.
85. See A. AMsTEiAm, TRiAL MANUAL FOR 'ra DEFENSE oF CsuNAsmts CASES § 229 (1975).
Professor Amsterdam suggests that courts nearly always hold properly warranted searches reasonable
under the fourth amendment.
86. This theory is discussed at notes i63-2o, 217-34 infra and accompanying text
87. This is essentially the position taken by Judge Peckham in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353
F. Supp. 124, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 74-3212, 9th Cir., Nov. 20, 1974. See
notes 217-34 infra and accompanying text for a critique of this position.
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recognize that press interests require special protection which traditional
fourth amendment doctrine by itself may not be capable of supporting.88
Free press. The media receive their most extensive constitutional protection from the first amendment's prohibition of governmental action
abridging freedom of the press." Media functions that have been constitutionally recognized include gathering," editing," and distributing"
information." Most important, any government investigation forcing access to press information impedes the newsgathering function by threatening confidential sources with exposure, thus discouraging them from
passing information to the press.9" However, a search and seizure may
also, during its progress, physically disrupt all three functions."
2. Governmental interests.
Combattingcrime via search and seizure. The primary societal interest

underlying law enforcement is "security for the person and property of the
individual" from "reprehensible conduct forbidden to all other persons.""
In the attempts by police to provide that security, a search is one of the most
effective tools. It often provides a swift means of obtaining such persuasive
evidence of criminal activity as narcotics, contraband, or weapons. By
quarantining illicit items, the search may prevent future crime as well as
88. See notes 217-34 infra and accompanying text.
89. U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
9o. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 68r (1972).
92. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 52 (ioth Cir. 1973).
92. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
93. For a case discussing all three of the interests listed in the text in the context of a press
subpoena, see Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, io84-85, reh. en banc denied, 466 F.2d ogo
(gth Cr. 1972). The interests are more carefully analyzed with respect to searches and subpoenas
at notes 188-99 infra and accompanying text.
94- Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694-95 (1972). See also V. BLAsi, supra note 14;
Murasky, supra note 27. These authors offer a fuller discussion of the societal importance of the
interest in the free flow of information that populate the related area of governmental subpoenas of
journalists.
95. See notes x88-9o infra and accompanying text. In addition, the past pattern of searching
the underground or dissident press, see note 3 supra, imposes a discriminatory penalty on them for
their editorial stances. See TwENTwrss Caswrtry FtmN, supra note 3, criticizing a "double standard
of [law enforcement] treatment, one for the underground and one for the established press . . . that
is inconsistent with the First Amendment's guarantee . . . " Id. at 36, which occurs because "underground publications are almost always out of favor with the local governments and in bad odor
with other influential circles of the communities where they are published. They have greater proclivity for antagonizing officialdom than the daily press ...
." Id. at 34. Discriminatory pressures
on the underground media may also affect nonpress interests in free expression because the informants,
as well as patrons, of the underground press often "are members of a minority political or cultural
group that relies heavily on the media to propagate its views," so that discriminatory police incursions against such media can have the dangerous effect of limiting public discussion of unpopular
views. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694-95 (1972). See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (x927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), for the classic statement of the dangers involved even in the
suppression of what the majority deems "noxious doctrine," and A. MELaEyoIN, FREE SPEECH AND
rTs RELATioN To SELF-GOv-RNMaNT 22-27, 37-39, 88-89 (1948), for discussion of the proposition
that the first amendment's chief concern is not the theorists' right to express, but the voters' right
to hear all sides of any question related to self-governance.
96. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690, 692 (1972).
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help to convict the guilty."7 Thus far, police executing warrants against news
media have sought anonymous communiques claiming credit for crimes or
photographs of alleged criminal acts.98 To the extent that the police are
denied the use of this technique, the prosecution of a given crime may
become considerably more difficult or expensive. Clearly, the utter denial
of access to this evidence when held by the press could impose significant
costs on society.
Informed governmental dispute-solving. Combatting crime is only one
aspect of the government's larger responsibility for providing society with
peaceful adjudicative means of resolving disputes-whether between the
government and criminal defendants or between civil litigants. To fulfill
this role, the government must provide adequate access to relevant information not only in criminal investigations but in criminal and civil courts as
well. Accordingly, common law courts since the i 7 th century have recognized what Dean Wigmore called the "fundamental maxim that the public
...has a right to every man's evidence."9 Modern adjudication continues
to stress the testimonial duty of all citizens, even to the point of suggesting
that due process for litigants constitutionally requires it."'
However, the importance of the interest in the informed resolution of
disputes can be overstated. Unduly aggressive insistence upon obtaining the
fullest scope of "every man's evidence" may have counterproductive effects that outweigh society's need for the evidence.1"' Thus, in the same
section in which Wigmore discusses the duty of every person to testify, he
cautions courts to "make the duty as little onerous as possible" given the
infringement upon the witness' privacy." 2 Efforts to make the least drastic
demands on the witness actually enhance the ability of courts and government investigators to gather information.' Inadequate sensitivity to the
rights of witnesses would soon rob the courts of the respect on which their
authority rests.'
97. See DETECTION OF CRIME 97-98 (L. Tiffany, D. McIntyre, Jr., D. Rotenberg eds. z966);
0. WILSON & R. McLAREN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 382 (3d ed. 1972).
98. See note 3 supra.
99. 8 J. WiGmoRE, supra note 28, at § 2192, paraphrasing Sir Francis Bacon in the Countess of
Shrewbury's Trial, z Howell's St. Trials 769, 778 (162). Cf. C. McComuicK, supra note 28, at § 77.
xoo. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (i974); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1,9-io (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-81 (1919); d. Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953) ("The duty to disclose knowledge of crime rests upon all citizens.
It is so vital that one known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material
witness.") See also Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.) (Stewart, J., sitting by designation),
cert. denied., 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
Ioi. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2210(1), at 152.
102. Id. § 2192, at 73 (emphasis in original); accord, C. McCovaiUeK, supra note 28, § 41, at 82.
103. The government's duty to temper its informational demands reflects a recognition of personal interests in privacy from governmental intrusion discussed at notes 8o-88 supra and accompanying text.
104. Even the privilege against self-incrimination has been supported on the ground that it
sacrifices the courts' ability to wrest certain information from witnesses in the short run in order to
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B. Branzburg and Its Aftermath: A Qualified PressPrivilege
with Respect to Subpoenas
The major Supreme Court case to deal with most of these interests is
Branzburg v. Hayes.' s Justice White's majority opinion in Branzburg
purported to afford press newsgathering some first amendment protection
from the inhibition of the flow of information from confidential sources
to the media admittedly caused by subpoenas.' But his opinion held
that the investigatory needs of the grand jury ordinarily establish a compelling state interest sufficient to overcome the press interests.' The
emphasis of the opinion was upon one of the two press interests-unbridled
press newsgathering-although Justice White did allude to the public's and
the press' interest in freedom from harassment and uncontrolled intrusions
by grand jury investigations.' 8
Justice Powell's "enigmatic""' addendum to the 5-Justice opinion in
which he concurred took an approach more sympathetic to the press. He
explicitly balanced the press' interests in newsgathering and freedom
from undue governmental interference in its private affairs by grand juries
against society's need to fight crime and to have adjudicative bodies capable
of compelling the production of necessary evidence. Although he found
the press interests subordinate, he articulated a test for permissible subpoenas of the press considerably more solicitous of the interests of subpoenaed reporters than the majority opinion. Justice Powell would require
a reporter to appear and to undergo questioning, but he suggested that the
reporter could refuse to answer. Should the grand jury pursue the question
encourage them voluntarily to produce more evidence in the long run out of "respect for . . . the
dignity of the judicial system." C. McCoRmicx, supra note 28, § 118, at 252-53.
105. 4o8 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg actually involved three cases. Besides Branzburg v.
Pound, 46r S.W.2d 345 (Ky., 1970), the cases decided were In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266
N.E.2d 297 (197), and Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d o8i ( 9 th Cit. 1970). All three involved reporters called to testify before grand juries investigating allegedly criminal activity which
the reporters had viewed in their role as newsgatherers. Paul Branzburg witnessed and described in
a Kentucky newspaper the illegal use and synthesization of marijuana into hashish, 408 U.S. at 66771; Paul Pappas, a television reporter, viewed activities at Black Panther headquarters in New Bedford, Massachusetts, during civil disorders there, id. at 672-75; Earl Caldwell was present at several
speeches and interviews at which members of the Black Panther Party advocated violent revolution
and the assassination of President Nixon, id. at 675-79. In Branzburgand Pappas, the Supreme Court
upheld orders of the Kentucky and Massachusetts Supreme Courts, respectively, compelling the reporters' testimony. In Caldwell the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which, applying a
balancing test similar to the one advocated by Justice Stewart, infra note 11o, had refused to order
Caldwell to testify. The Branzburg trilogy is discussed in Murasky, supra note 27; The Supreme Court
1971 Term, 86 HARv.L. REv. 103, 137-48 (1972).

io6. See 408 U.S. at 681, 69o-9. See id. 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring) and Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), stressing this aspect of Justice White's
opinion.
107. 4o8 U.S. at 685-91, 700.

io8. Id. at 688, 707-08.
og. The word is Justice Stewart's in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 725. Note also Justice Stewart's
quip that Branzburg was decided by a vote of "four and a half to four and a half." "Or of
the Press," Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation, Nov. 2, 1974,
excerpted in 26HAsT.L.J. 631, 635 (1975).
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by seeking a court order, the hearing judge would be required to strike a
"case-by-case" balance between freedom of the press and the governmental
interest in the information sought.11 Because Justice Powells vote determined the outcome in Branzburg,his defense of a qualified degree of constitutional protection makes the Court's majority opinion less conclusive.'
Furthermore "the limited nature of the Court's holding '" is manifest
in the peculiar factual settings of the three cases decided under Branzburg.
All of the plaintiff newsmen had actually witnessed the allegedly criminal
activity under investigation by grand juries, rather than merely been informed of it, as is more often the case. Justice White pointedly stated in
Branzburg that first amendment or any other considerations militating
against testifying in those circumstances are insubstantial." 3 The Court's
!I0. 408 U.S. at 709-Io (Powell, J., concurring). Elements in the balance would include the
relationship of the information sought to the subject of the investigation and the legitimacy of the
law enforcement need. Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, would
have allowed newspersons to contest the validity of a subpoena prior to appearing before the grand
jury. Before a press subpoena would be enforced by the courts, he would have required the government
to show (a) that probable cause existed to believe that the newsperson had information clearly
relevant to a specific crime, (b) that the information was unavailable through alternative means less
inhibitive of press newsgathering abilities, and (c) that the grand jury had a compelling need for
the information. 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the
Developing Qualified Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HAsr. L.J. 709, 717 (1975), argues that Powell's test
does no more than change the burden of proof in Justice Stewart's dissent from the government to the
reporter as to the strength of the government's need for the information sought. But Goodale's
characterization erroneously equates Justice Powell's requirement of a "legitimate" law enforcement
need with Justice Stewart's of a "compelling and overriding" one. Furthermore, he ignores the fact
that Justice Powell would require the newsperson's appearance for testimony with challenges to
specific questions only, while Justice Stewart's judicial balancing would preclude any forced appearance. However, with regard to physical evidence, Justices Powell and Stewart do advocate similar
tests since process that commands the production of such evidence (subpoena duces tecum) is specific
enough at the time it is issued to allow preproduction challenge even under Justice Powell's test. This
specificity contrasts with process which commands oral testimony (subpoena ad testificatum), since
the details of that testimony are unclear until the witness undergoes questioning. All three cases in
Branzburg, of course, involved the latter type of subpoena. However, the former is the proper
analogue of a search warrant seeking physical evidence. Thus, five Justices favored a procedure requiring a chance for the press to challenge government demands for physical evidence before it is
seized, since Justice Douglas would have protected reporters from all government subpoenas for
evidence of crimes not allegedly committed by them. 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
Goodale, supra at 713-19 for a minute analysis of the different positions taken in the four Branzburg
opinions.
IIi. See Goodale, supra note i o, at 715. Goodale, General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the New York Times, treats the White opinion as a mere "plurality." A similar conclusion
concerning the limited authority of Justice White's opinion is reached in Gunther, In Search of
Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STaN. L. REv.1oo, io24-26
(1972).
X12. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. 4o8 U.S. at 692. Justice Whites ratio decidendi might be held to the following sentence:
"Insofar as any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify about the crime he witnessed,
his claim of privilege under the first amendment presents no substantial question." See People v.
Marahan, 81 Misc. 367, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (distinguishing Branzburg on the
strength of this language); cf. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 73, 725, 294 A.2d 149, 154-55,
a0l'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). Lightman discusses
cases (including the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Branzburg) that deny the protection
of state shield laws covering "sources" to an "informer" who is simultaneously acting in the role
of a perpetrator of crime. Branzburg and Lightman fit
within the normal pattern of restricting privileged "communications" to things told to, but not to things seen by, the protected professional. Cf.
C. McCoa, scs, supra note 28, at § zoo.
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reluctance to give up what is probably the best evidence relating to the
relevant activity and its realization that this piece of evidence available to
the newsperson would have existed whether or not the press was involved
make this a particularly hard case for allowing a citizen-even a newsperson-to refuse to testify."4
Branzburg's holding is also narrow because all three reporter-plaintiffs
refused even to appear before the grand jury in answer to five of the six
subpoenas."' Most of the cases before and since involve instead the refusal
of a journalist in the midst of testifying to answer only certain questions
bearing on matters allegedly privileged."' The refusal to appear presents
a more sweeping claim of exemption from every person's duty to offer
evidence than does a refusal to answer selected questions." 7 Furthermore,
some of the differences between Justice Powell and the dissenters focus on
problems relevant only to a subpoena ad testificatum, that is, one seeking
oral testimony; there may be more agreement among them in cases involving subpoenas duces tecum, that is, ones seeking physical evidence."'
Branzburg may also be a limited precedent because of the narrow press
interest involved in that case. The case concerns the "uncertain" effect
of governmental intrusion upon only one of the several press functions discussed above: newsgathering."9 In cases where the governmental intrusion inhibits the press in its editing and disseminating functions as well,
the courts may weigh first amendment interests more heavily' ° Moreover,
Branzburgdid not present as intense a threat to the fourth amendment interests in privacy as police searches of media offices. Thus, the "gloom''
1X4. This analysis was suggested by a discussion with Professor Jack Friedenthal of Stanford
Law School, Dec. i, 2975. Professor Friedenthal distinguished testimony privileges (e.g., a
spouse's privilege not to testify against a spouse) from confidential communications privileges (e.g.,
the lawyer-client privilege). He deemed the granting of the former privileges more likely to prevent
information from reaching the courts because they deny the courts the witness' first-hand knowledge,
which will exist whether or not the witness has a testimonial privilege. On the other hand, he noted
that confidential communications privileges are less likely to impede the flow of information to the
courts, since denial of these privileges would simply encourage the parties not to "make the evidence"
by not participating in frank confidential communications.
I15. 408 U.S. at 670-79; see id. at 667: "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen
to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not." See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d
1059, rehearing en bane denied, 466 F.2d 7o9o (gth Cir. 1972) (refusing rehearing in light of
Branzburgin part because of this distinction); Goodale, supra note io, at 713.
116. See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d io59 ( 9 th Cir. 1972).
117. Reporters often refuse to appear because they feel that their inability to prove to their sources
that they did not divulge confidential information in the secret grand jury proceedings will inhibit
sources from continued provision of information to the press. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d io8i
(gth Cir. 1970), overruled by Branzburg, justified a subpoenaed reporter's nonappearance on this
basis.
ix8. See note iro supra.
i9. 408 U.S. at 682; see notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
720. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d io59, rehearing denied en bane, 466 F.2d io9o (9th
Cir. 1972).
121. Goodale, supra note 27, at 133.
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with which the press initially greeted Branzburg has gradually lifted as
have emphasized its factual limitations and the Powell qualifilower courts
2
cations.' 1
C. Beyond Branzburg: Comparative Impact of Subpoena and Search on
Press and Governmental Interests
The grand jury's role and its "essential" reliance on the subpoena provided crucial impetus for Justice White's decision in Branzburg,25 and for
subsequent cases. 24 Replacing the grand jury/subpoena analysis in Branzburg with one involving police investigations and search warrants leaves
the press in a wholly different legal posture with respect to its rights to resist
government evidence-gathering efforts. Not only do these investigatory de122. See United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring), aff'g
354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. X972) (Branzburg "controlled" by Justice Powell's opinion); Murasky,
supra note 27, at 878, 915. For analysis of post-Branzburgcases, see Goodale, supra note iio; Murasky,
supra note 27; 5 N.C.L. Rav. 1550 (1973). In the context of criminal investigations, the courts
have provided a less uniform and more qualified newsperson's privilege. Nonetheless, all but one
have applied a balancing test requiring some governmental showing of need to overcome the damage
to first amendment interests before grand juries or trial courts can compel journalists to reveal
sources or produce information. Compare Bursey v. United States, 466 Fad 2o59, rehearingdenied en
banc, 466 F.2d xo9o (9th Cir. 1972), with United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C.), af'd,
478 Fad 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Only a New Jersey Superior Court found in Branzburga per se denial
to newspersons of any immunization from governmental testimonial compulsion. In re Bridge, 2o N.J.
Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (2972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1973). Subsequent state court decisions, even in criminal cases, have found a fairly protective journalist's privilege even while purportedly following Branzburg's logic. See cases cited infra. The factors weighing in the courts' balancing include those discussed supra notes 8o-104 and accompanying text. The courts, taking Justice
Powell's case-by-case approach, stress the particular weight of each interest under the circumstances
of the case and often insist upon alternative governmental techniques that protect society's interests
and yet avoid infringing first amendment interests. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 Fad
778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied. 422 U.S. 966 (2973) (Branzburg does not "require disclosure
of confidential sources in each and every case both civil and criminal"; a balancing test is required);
Bursey v. United States, supra (three-part test: (a) immediate, substantial, subordinating government
interest, (b) substantial connection between the information sought and that interest, (c) necessity of
obtaining the information from the press). A panel of the Ninth Circuit decided Bursey prior to
Branzburg,but the full court refused to hear it again based on that case, reciting several distinguishing,
if originally not emphasized, factors discussed in notes 112-21 supra and accompanying text. The
Bursey test, however, has transcended those distinctions and has been applied in several newsgathering
cases since. See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. x972) (Leventhal, J., concurring);
In re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 233, 240 (C.D. Cal. 2974); In re Bensky, Misc. 75-28-OJC (N.D. Cal.,
filed
April x5, 1975). But see In re Lewis, 5o Fad 428 ( 9 th Cir. 2974) (applying a less stringent test
in a case not involving Bursey's distinguishing features); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208
(D.D.C.), aj'd, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. x922). While the picture is not much clearer than that
painted by Justice White and retouched by Justice Powell in Branzburg, courts since, even in criminal
cases, have highlighted a vague and qualified testimonial privilege and have made the situation
brighter from the press' standpoint than some commentators persist in claiming. See Comment,
supra note 29, at 428-29.
123. 408 U.S. at 685-96, especially at 688. Justice Whites opinion should be viewed as a monument to the importance of unfettered grand jury investigation of crime, not as a gravestone over the
rights of the press.
124. See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 2o59 (gth Cir. 1972). But see United States
v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir.), a#'g 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 2972), extending Branzburg to a trial court's subpoena of the press, though with little consideration of Branzburg's preoccupation with the grand jury. The following analysis deals mainly with the grand jury subpoena
on the one hand and the police search warrant on the other. However, much of what is said concerning the procedural and judicial-supervisory protectiveness of the grand jury applies with equal
or more force to trial courts that issue press subpoenas.
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vices transgress the same constitutional freedoms to different degrees; they
also impact different constitutional interests. A police search, for example,
invades fourth amendment individual privacy much more seriously than
a subpoena, yet it also may serve more pressing societal needs for information. This section of the Note compares the effects of grand jury subpoenas
and police search warrant procedures on the governmental and press interests discussed above to set the stage for a new balancing of them in
the search situation.
i. Grand jury subpoenas.

Potentialprotection of press interests.Traditionally, the grand jury has
served the role of a mediator between citizens and government prosecutors, 2 ' and the press has historically benefitted from that mediation. A
colonial New York grand jury, for example, opposed the prosecution of
John Peter Zenger for seditious libel of the English government,"' and
grand juries throughout the colonies refused to indict colonial journalists
for their seditious libels against the Stamp Act. ' This historical affinity of
grand juries for privacy and particularly for press interests persists today,
albeit in new forms.
The conclusion of the United States Supreme Court that "the Constitution could not tolerate the transformation of the grand jury into an instrument of oppression" 2 8 has enabled considerable court supervision of the
grand jury. Although courts only rarely have been called upon to exercise
this supervision and often have exhibited deference to grand jury proceedings,"' courts do have the power to assure that the grand jury does not exceed its powers in overzealous pursuit of its investigatory mandate.'
125. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,
390 (1962); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489-90 (396o) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); cf.
Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor,the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U.
Cm. L. REV. 761, 764-65 (972).
x26. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATivE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGERPRINTR OF THE NEw YoRsu WEEKLy Jou1NAL 37-x8, 45-48 (2d ed. 1972).

127. See F. Mo-rr, AMERICAN JouRNAuIsm: A HISTORY OF NawsPAPEs IN THE UNITED STATES
THmouGH 270 YEAas: 169o to 396o, at 3o3-o8 ( 3 d ed. 3962).
328. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1973). See In re Grand jury Proceedings, 486
F.2d 85, 91-92 ( 3d Cir. 1973), quoting United States v. Doe, 405 F.2d 436, 438 (2d Cir. x968)
(Friendly, J.): "[c]ven though evidence is not within a testimonial privilege, the due process clause
protects against the use of excessive means to obtain it" See also id. at 91 (Schofield I), listing eight
separate constitutional and nonconstitutional defenses to subpoenas duces tecum. The grand jury is
sometimes erroneously mistrusted for the "almost total lack of limitations imposed upon its powers of
inquiry." Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions
and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 3198, 3239 (1970); see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
744-45 n.34 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also note 147 infra.
329. In order to maintain the grand jury's mobility as a vehicle for fighting crime, the courts
observe a presumption of regularity of grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 99, 994 (D.R.I. 1975).
33o. There are several aspects of judicial control over grand juries. The grand jury is an agent
of the court, and grand jurors its officers, so that the court in most jurisdictions after (a) convening
the grand jury may (b) discharge it for any or no reason, even before its work is completed, (c) in-
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Much of this supervisory power is exercised in response to witnesses' objections to grand jury assaults on their privacy. When ordered to testify
pursuant to a subpoena ad testificatum, a witness may object via a motion
to quash to prevent harassment or to declare the grand jury without jurisdiction via claims of immunity or via objections to specific questions as repetitious, irrelevant, or in search of privileged information.' Despite the deference shown grand juries by the courts,"'2 such challenges occasionally
succeed on the merits.' Furthermore, the courts may find the subpoena
valid and still partially defend witnesses' interests with protective orders
limiting the testimony to specified areas or by ordering publication of the
grand jury record to inform affected parties of the scope of the revelations
made by the witness." 4
struct the grand jury, (d) refuse to authorize payment of any of the grand jurors or jury's expenses,
(e) discipline grand jurors or its officers (including prosecutors) or dismiss grand jury indictments
because of breaches of secrecy or other duties, (f) prevent bad faith or harassing investigations, (g)
moderate any undue influence of the prosecutor, (h) confine the grand jury's inquiry to its proper
geographical and subject matter jurisdictions, (i) protect the rights and privileges (including testimonial) of witnesses before the grand jury, and (j) refuse to authorize or quash subpoenas issued by
the grand jury. Of great importance, too, the grand jury must often go to court when it affects the
rights of citizens from whom it demands evidence. The modern judicial trend, advanced by Branzburg, emphasizes the courts' power-indeed responsibility-to exercise a restraining force upon grand
juries particularly when they threaten privacy and other rights of citizens called before them. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688, 707-08 (1972); id. at 7o (Powell, J., concurring). See United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (i974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, io (I973); In re
Grand jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973); Bursey v. United States, 466
F.2d 1059, rehearingen banc denied, 466 F.2d iogo, IO9i--92 (gth Cir. 1972); United States v. Smyth,
104 F. Supp. 283, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings, The Prosecutor,

The Trial judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. Cmi. L. RE. 76x, 768-69 (1972); Comment, Constitutional Rights of Witnesses in FederalGrand jury Proceedings: Bursey v. United States, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 9oo (1973). See also A. AmsEmRam, supra note 85, at §§ x63, 172; L. ORFmLD, CRMNAL
PROCEDUE UNDER TE FEDEALM. RuLts § 6:so8 (1966); Note, The Grand jury as an Investigatory
Body, 74 HARv. L. RPv. 59o (1961).
131. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 84o, 844 (8th Cir. 1973); Bursey v. United
States, 466 F.2d X059, 1079-81 (gth Cir. 1972); A. AmassrRDAm, supranote 85, at § x63; 8 J. WiVinmoRE, supra note 25 at § 221o(i); Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967
Duxz L.J. 97, o--o2. But see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (grand jury witness

in federal court cannot object to irrelevant questions). A. AmSsmsDAm, supra note 85, at § 161(B),
lists several other grounds upon which a grand jury witness may refuse to answer particular questions. Some states' grand juries are also required by statute to conduct their proceedings according
to all the rules of evidence. All state and federal grand juries must at least honor testimonial privileges. See FEo. R. Evso. iioi (d) (2); A. AMsmRDAm, supra note 85, at § 155.
132. See note 129 supra.
133. See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 ( 9 th Cir. 1972); United States v. Smyth,
104 F. Supp. 283, 292-93 (ND. Cal. 1952).
134. Thus, for example, a subpoenaed attorney, reflecting his client's fears that appearance or

production of documents before a grand jury might jeopardize the confidentiality of privileged
information, may refuse to honor the subpoena. Should the court decide that the testimony or documents may be relevant, necessary and at least in part unprivileged, the witness may still seek a protective order limiting the questions or document requests to those which are relevant, necessary and
nonprivileged. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). In limited
circumstances, the court may also order publication of parts of the grand jury record so that the
witness may assure the client (or confidential news source) as to what was or was not revealed. See
Transcript Rulings Before Judge Avakian, at 34, In re Death of Marcus Foster (Super. Ct., Dep't r,
March 28, 1974), ordering the grand jury to make public the questions it asked a reporter in order
to apprise his sources of the harmlessness of his testimony from their point of view. See also In re
Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 570-72 (C.D. Cal. 1971); C. McCoauscx, supra note 28, at § 113. In some
jurisdictions, counsel may even appeal to the grand jury's discretion by letter. See A. AmsmnrDa.,
supra note 85, at § 164.
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If the court denies the witness any relief from testifying, the grand jury
may seek to enforce the subpoena by court order and court-imposed contempt sanctions.' Even then, however, there remains a modicum of protection for the recalcitrant witness. Before any contempt santions can be imposed, the witness has a right to an unequivocal court order to respond to
the subpoena; 30 if criminal contempt is involved, the witness can demand
an explanation by the court of its basis for the charge as well as an attorney
and a reasonable time for the preparation of a defense. 3 ' Even after being
cited for contempt, the witness may appeal that judgment before suffering
any punishment."8 Thus, it is only after a full examination of the issues involved that an unwilling witness must suffer any penalty for resisting a

subpoena.
Nonetheless, if reporters, like other witnesses, ultimately can be forced
to testify before secret grand juries, confidential sources fearing identification in those proceedings will be reluctant to talk to the press." 9 The Branzburg majority, however, held that the value to society of the subpoenaed
testimony of reporters who have witnessed crimes overcomes the "consequential but uncertain" negative impact of the subpoena on protected newsgathering."" Justice White downplayed subpoenas' inhibition of newsgathering because at most the source is forced to rely on the good faith of the
reporter, with whom the informant often has a "symbiotic" or mutually

trusting relationship.'' Their understanding may require that the newsperson go to jail,' 2 or it may simply require that the reporter reveal as
little of the confidential material as the law allows in testimony that may be
limited by court order to nonsensitive subjects or that may later be reproduced for the source as proof of the journalist's good faith.' 3 Thus, judicial
supervision and procedural safeguards prevent subpoenas, in Justice White's
words, from
"requir[ing] the press .
144
sources.

..

indiscriminately to disclose" its

Of more practical significance regarding the protection of press interests is the opportunity for reevaluation of positions by all the participants in
the subpoena process-the witness, witness' counsel, the grand jurors, the
135. See Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.; c. Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243 (1973); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.

364, 371 (x966); Nilva v. United States,
28, § 92, at 393.
X39.
140.
141.
142.

227

F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1955); C. MCCORMIcK, supra note

See generally V. BLASI, supra note 14.
408 U.S. at 690.
408 U.S. at 694.

One study shows that in almost all cases in which the grand jury insisted upon a reporter's testimony, the newsperson accepted a contempt citation rather than testify. See Murasky,
supra note 27, at 858 n.94.
143. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
144, 408 U.S. at 682.
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government attorney, and the judge. At each stage of the process these people may propose ways to make the evidence available through means least
damaging to the witness' interests. Thus, the adversarial nature of the proceeding causes constant reassessment of priorities by each participant to
assure that only crucial interests of each are accommodated. For instance,
every time a witness objects to the subpoena or refuses to answer a question,
the members of the grand jury must agree, with the advice of a prosecutor
and the consent of a judge, upon a procedure for pressing further its demands for evidence. With new input from these several perspectives, 4 ' the
grand jury must weigh the importance of the evidence sought against the
administrative costs of pursuing it, considering the adamancy of the witness'
refusal.'" After such reevaluation, the grand jury may decide voluntarily to
withdraw the subpoena and, in so doing, protect the witness' interests. 47
145. To the extent that exclusion of prospective grand jurors on racial, economic, ethnic, religious, or sexual grounds violates the due process and equal protection clauses, the grand jury's range
of different perspectives is constitutionally mandated. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972); A. AMSTRDAmr, supranote 85, at § 158.
146. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972): 'The reporter may never be called and
if he objects to testifying, the prosecution may not insist." Cf. Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings:
The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. Cm.L. REv. 761, 765 (1972). Nor is
it unimportant that the witness may delay (or accelerate) the production of evidence solely for personal convenience, should it also suit the convenience of the grand jury. See United States v. Doe, 457
F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972).
147. An example of the use of these techniques by a prospective grand jury witness illustrates
their protectiveness. Three times a federal grand jury subpoenaed Harvard University professor
Samuel Popkin concerning the illegal leaking of classified government documents to the press. He
objected to all three subpoenas, claiming a privilege based upon academic freedom. Although Popkin
lost each of the litigated challenges to the subpoenas, his five appearances before a trial court and
one before an appellate court succeeded in encouraging the grand jury voluntarily to drop two of the
subpoenas and some of the questions asked pursuant to the third. United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328
(ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (x973). Some modern criticism of the grand jury suggests that it functions as a "rubber stamp" for, rather than a potential protector of citizens from,
zealous prosecutors who control the presentation of evidence and legal advice to the grand jury.
A. AasrmaAm, supra note 85, at § 155; see United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381
F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. X974). While this criticism generally objects to the lack of protection
afforded the potential criminal defendant facing indictment, it also bears on the procedural and
temperamental safeguards which this Note has argued the grand jury affords witnesses. For example,
it is feared that the ability of the district attorney to examine witnesses before the grand jury in the
absence of opposing counsel neutralizes the witness' statutory and procedural rights. See, e.g., A.
AMSTERDAm, supra note 85, at § 155. However, even grand jury critics note that previously wellcounseled witnesses can thwart an overbearing prosecutor by steadfastly claiming their rights. This
might initially encourage grand jurors to express their potentially independent and moderating views
--a not unheard-of-event. See id., at § 155, 16o-64. See also the independent decision of the grand
jury investigating the Watergate break-in and cover-up to name President Nixon as an unindicted
coconspirator. E. Dazw, WASHiNGToN JouRNAL-THE EVENTS OF 1973-1974 287 (1974). In addition, a witness' continued refusal to respond will necessitate judicial intervention to compel testimony,
if the prosecutor and grand jury press the inquiry. At that point, the process becomes adversarial. The
courts have not ignored the possibility of abuses from prosecutorial autocracy. Indeed, the modern
trend toward heightened judicial power over grand juries has included more exacting restraints
on prosecutorial attempts to influence rather than inform the grand jury. See, e.g., State v. Joao,
53 Hawaii 226, 491 P.2d 1o89 (1971) (indictment quashed because based upon the testimony of a
witness who, the district attorney told the grand jury, wanted to make "a clean breast [of things]");
c. Franklin v. State, 85 Nev. 382, 513 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1973) ("In presenting a case to a grand
jury a prosecutor... must scrupulously refrain from words or conduct that will invade the province
of the grand jury or tend to influence the jurors in their judgment"). Given the criticism of the
abuses of the grand jury, it is not surprising that the very opinions that have reaffirmed the
centrality of the grand jury in American criminal prosecution have also reiterated the need and

May 1976]

PRESS SEARCHES

The majority in Branzburg alluded to the potential for press protection
inherent in the good judgment and secret deliberations of grand juries. 4
The court refused to apply to the grand jury the procedural and substantive
safeguards developed by it to restrain legislative subpoenas that touch first
amendment interests. 4 ' In part this holding rests on the greater tendency
of legislators than grand jurors needlessly to harass witnesses and upon the
decorum associated with grand jury proceedings.
When a subpoena duces tecum is used, it most nearly achieves for the
grand jury what search and seizure does for the police: the production of
physical evidence. The procedural, practical and substantive protections afforded a person faced with a subpoena duces tecum exceed those of a recipient of a subpoena ad testificatum."'5 Early in this century the Supreme
Court in Hale v. Henkel.. determined that requests for documents by subpoena had to meet the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness." 2
Following Hale, the federal courts have allowed witnesses to object to the
subpoena on fourth amendment reasonableness grounds, and the grand jury
cannot obtain a court order enforcing the process until it fulfills its burden
of proving reasonableness. 3
potential for judicial control of the body. See cases cited in note 30 supra. Note also C. McCoRMIcx,
supra note 28, § 137, at 29o, regarding a modern trend to hedge grand jury proceedings with protective procedures.
148. Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
149. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (legislators must prove a "substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest" before affecting first amendment interests).
150. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1973), notes the divergent protections
afforded persons subject to the two types of subpoenas. Most of the protections afforded the recipient
of a subpoena ad testificatum, discussed in notes 130-38 supra and accompanying text, are available
to the recipient of a subpoena duces tecum. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.ad
347 ( 9 th Cir. 2964) (subpoena duces tecum naming privileged records is invalid); A. AMSTERDAM,
supra note 85, at § x63.
251. 202 U.S. 43 (2906).
152. id. at 63-65, 76. The Court held that the grand jury must show both "some necessity"
grounded on other evidence "to justify" production and a certain degree of specificity in the items
named. In F'C v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 3o6 (1924), Justice Holmes reiterated
the fourth amendment requirement that "a ground must be laid" for a subpoena duces tecum. See
United States v. Dionisio 410 U.S. 2, 21-12 (1973) (dictum). See also Application of Certain
Chinese Benevolent and Dist. Ass'ns, 29 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal. 2956). Because Hale and American
Tobacco apply the fourth amendment, their analysis may bind the states under Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (x962).
153. A subpoenaed federal witness overcomes the grand jury's presumption of regularity by
showing that the subpoena is overly broad, nonspecific, or covers an unreasonably long period of
time. The government must respond by showing necessity or reasonableness. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 2973), explained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Schofield II),507 F.2d 963, 966 ( 3 d Cir. 1975) (subpoena for handwriting exemplars, fingerprints,
and mug shots must be accompanied by affidavits showing (a) the evidence's relevance and (b) that
the primary purpose of the subpoena is as an aid to a grand jury investigation of matters (c) within
the jury's jurisdiction; witness may use discovery proceedings to test the truth of the three affirmations in the grand jury's affidavit); In re Grand jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 991
(D.R.I. 1975); ci. Universal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 508 F.2d 684, 686 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975).
Actually the Supreme Court cases could be read to require a showing of necessity and specificity to
accompany all requests by federal grand juries for subpoenas duces tecum even if unchallenged, and
one United States Circuit Court so requires in some circumstances. See In re Grand jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 391 F. SupP. 991, 995-99 (D.R.I. 1975).

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. ",8:Page 957

Therefore, along with the procedural protection of the witness' interests
discussed in relation to subpoenas ad testificatum-total or partial judicial
protection based on the merits of the witness' refusal and the reevaluation
of priorities by all participants in the procedure-the witness subject to a
subpoena duces tecum has the additional advantage of placing the burden
of justifying production on the government. Of supreme importance, of
course, is the availability of this entire protective apparatus before any testimony with harmful effects on newsgathering takes place. Justice White in
Branzburg stressed all of these press-protective characteristics of the subpoena process-judicial supervision, amenability to prior challenge, and
secrecy of grand jury deliberations-in concluding that subpoenas' limited
harmful effects on the press were outweighed by their societal value' 4
Grandjury subpoenas'potentialfor serving governmental interests.The

most recent Supreme Court cases considering the grand jury have emphasized its "important, constitutionally mandated role" in "effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the
individual."' 55 Grand jury investigations and indictments provide the most
often-used avenue to the prosecution of serious crime in most American
jurisdictions'5 And the Supreme Court has held that the subpoena is "essential' ' 57 to the grand jury's fulfillment of its law enforcement task. Without the subpoena, the grand jury would have no authoritative means of
acquiring testimony or commanding the production of evidence before it.
While occasionally government prosecutors are accorded the subpoena power, most states reserve it to the grand jury.' Consequently, in most jurisdictions, utilization of the subpoena requires the empanelment of a grand jury.
Grand juries are generally empanelled throughout the year, 9 although
some states have fairly elaborate procedures for assigning a specific case to
a grand jury enabling it to issue necessary subpoenas.' Despite its importance to the grand jury (which is in turn crucial to American criminal
154. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700, 707 (1972).
155. Id. at 69o (1972); see id. at 688, 700; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974);
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Blair v. United States, 25o U.S. 273 (1919);
United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
156. The fifth amendment mandates grand jury indictment for serious federal offenses. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. While not applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Hurtado
v. California, 11o U.S. 516 (1884), most states have similar constitutional requirements. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-88 (1972); A. AmsTaERDAnm, supra note 85, at §§ 20, 153. But see
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 30, 42,
noting that only 3.8% of all California felony prosecutions in 1972 were initiated by grand juries.
157. Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); see A. Ams-rDAnms, supra note 85, at § 2o.
i58. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
159. See A. Amns'rEDAm, supra note 85, at §§ 20-21, 153-55 for a discussion of grand jury
procedures.
16o. For example, in California a grand jury will not handle a case until assigned to it by a
criminal complaint committee. Even then, once the grand jury is empaneled and convened, the body
is technically free not to accept the case. See generally Petersen, The California Grand Jury System:
A Review and Suggestions for Reform, 5 PAC. L.J. 1 (i974).
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prosecution), the subpoena occasionally may not afford rapid governmental
acquisition of evidence. 1 '
The governmental interest in a potent subpoena power extends beyond
its use in acquiring evidence of criminal activity. Many government institutions other than grand juries and prosecutors, including courts, administrative agencies and legislatures, depend on such process to acquire vital information. The strength of every citizen's duty to provide the public with
0 is diluted when the subpoena power is qualified. To
available evidence"'
the extent that they rely on public responsibility, government agencies could
seriously suffer from that dilution.
2.

Presssearches.

While serving many of the same and some additional governmental interests as grand jury subpoenas, searches and seizures-even when buttressed with a warrant-are harsh, inflexible, and less protective of press
interests than the subpoena. Historically, search procedures have received

their greatest criticism when applied to the press: the libertarian dissatisfaction with uncontrolled searches that culminated in the fourth amendment's limits on all searches arose only after the i8th century English
government began using unrestrained searches against the press'
Even
today, the search remains problematic when applied in the press context 6 4
where, because of first amendment considerations, the Supreme Court has
traditionally required carefully drawn government procedures.' In parI6i. Once the grand jury is empaneled and convened, the subpoena process requires time in
identifying, locating, and serving the subpoenaed witness, and may take additional time if the
witness moves to quash.
162. The testimonial duty of all citizens and its enactment via subpoena are discussed at notes
99-104 supraand accompanying text.
x63. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965). For example, the use of searches to enforce
seditious libel laws against the opposition presses of men like John Wilkes prompted the first judicial
efforts to regulate oppressive criminal law enforcement procedures. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, 39
Howell's St. Trials 1153 (763); N. LAssoN, supra note 16, at 42; L. LEvY, supra note 16, at 145-47.
A similar dissatisfaction motivated colonial officials in New York to refuse to carry out the English
Governor's order to seize and burn John Peter Zenger's journal. See J. ALeXANDER, supra note 126,
at 17-18, 45-48.
164. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) ("a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness" of searches is due when first amendment interests are present).
365. The Court requires that if first amendment interests must suffer in the name of a higher
social value, the procedure used must be "tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the
case." Carrol v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968). Legal procedures,
"devices and doctrines [that] in most applications [are] consistent with the Constitution" have
received the Supreme Court's disapproval because "they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the
freedom of expression." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959). Indeed, the first amendment implicitly includes a body of procedural safeguards-i.e., a "due process" all its own. See
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. Rav. 518 (1970). The Supreme Court
generally insists on first amendment due process in cases in which both the substance of the law
being enforced and its procedures affect first amendment interests. See, e.g., Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483 (1973) (obscenity); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (x965) (criminal syndicalism);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (3964) (libel). In the case of police investigations
of criminal activity in which the press is not implicated, the substantive law in question concerns
activity unrelated to first amendment interests. Arguably, the threat to press rights is greater where
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ticular, the search procedure lacks the procedural and practical protections
inherent in the subpoena process upon which Justice White depended in
Branzburgto denigrate the subpoena's adverse press effects' 6 Indeed, since
even illegally seized evidence may become the basis for grand jury inquiry,' 67 it is simple to apply Branzburg'sfirst amendment analysis to condemn
searches. Insofar as every search and seizure potentially entails later presentation to the grand jury of items thus discovered, execution of a search
warrant has as significant a first amendment impact as such presentation by
subpoena. The existence of any additional first amendment consequences
from the search and seizure ipso facto would make that process more harmful to the press than Branzburgfound the subpoena to be. Many such consequences do accompany the search process.
Search warrants' harmful effects on press interests. At first glance, the

search and seizure process resembles the grand jury subpoena procedure in
several ways. First, there is judicial input because only a neutral, detached
judicial officer may issue a warrant.' However, upon closer scrutiny, the
apparent protectiveness of this judicial input shrinks. The magistrates and
police judges who issue search warrants are often people in whose decisionmaking the legal system reposes less confidence, given their limited responsibility and authority. Working closely with the police-often physically
located in the same offices-these magistrates are likely to have a symbiotic
rather than a supervisory relationship with the police." 9 This judicial attitude is clearly less protective than that of courts supervising grand juries.
Second, similar to the requirement that a grand jury show a reasonable
need for the evidence to justify production under a subpoena duces tecum,"
the court is authorized to issue a search warrant only upon a showing of
probable cause.'' Again, however, the protective veneer of this requirement fades when its actual application is examined. The requesting police
both the substance and procedure of the law impede first amendment activity. But the distinction
evaporates under closer scrutiny. However admirable its object, any procedure with a "collateral
effect" repugnant to first amendment values deserves disfavor. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
150-S (1959); see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Although the Court has repeatedly sanctioned prosecution of obscenity, libel, inflammatory speech, and criminal action prompted
by political beliefs, it has cautioned that the proximity of first amendment interests to those evils
requires that the government, in its haste to eradicate them, take care not to trample free expression.
No less should be required when the government seeks to pursue evidence of the evil of criminal
conduct across the press' doorstep.
x66. See note 148 supra and accompanying text. Contra, Murasky, supra note 27, at 886-87;
86 HAv. L. Rv. 1317, 1332 (1973).
167. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
x68. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
x69. See, e.g., Thompson v. Stahl, 346 F. Supp. 401 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (contempt of a magistrate not same as contempt of court in certain circumstances).
170. See notes 150-53 supraand accompanying text.
171. Probable cause requires proof of sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution

in the belief that the article sought evidences criminal activity and at present is located in the place
named in the warrant. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. xo8 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 16o, 175-76 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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officer may base the factual allegations in the affidavit supporting probable
cause upon the observations of informants-even those of uncertain reliability.' In addition most states and some federal courts do not even allow
the victim of a search to challenge a search after it has occurred by impeaching the averments in the affidavits accompanying the warrant request."
Further, the finding of probable cause is made ex parte, without the assistance of argument from opposing counsel; the opinion is based instead
upon papers "normally drafted by non-lawyers in the haste of criminal investigations.""'
Similarly, the burden on police officers to show probable cause seems in
theory more protective of the person searched than the burden on grand
juries to show mere reasonableness in justifying a subpoena duces tecum. A
comparison of the practical applications of the two burdens, however, reveals less protection than perceived in theory. While a grand jury must
show necessity, '" a mere showing that the item sought is relevant,"" even
if comparatively unimportant, to a criminal investigation will justify intrusion under a search warrant despite an overriding privacy interest that
the owner might have."" Further, and of particular importance to this Note,
the probable cause showing required for a search warrant lacks the adversarial input that in the subpoena context assures consideration of the public, statutory, and even constitutional policies that may otherwise allow
a reporter to withhold information sought by the government. Indeed, the
entire search warrant procedure, unlike the grand jury subpoena system,
thwarts any introduction of such policies into the decisionmaking process:
the ex parte decision to issue the warrant is followed by the speedy execution of the warrant by the police officerY 8
Thus, the possibility of any effective intervention and objection by the
affected citizen prior to police intrusion is negated; only insufficient post
facto remedies are available."' In all American jurisdictions except California the most important societal device for curbing wrongful searches172. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (196o); A. Amsrz sma., supra note 85, at § 24x.
x73. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 1o2, zo8 (1965). The Court therefore authorizes
magistrates to issue warrants without recourse to "[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity."

Id.
174. Even those courts allowing such a challenge seem to require purposive misrepresentations
or comparable bad faith on the affiant's part. See North Carolina v. Wrenn, 4M7 U.S. 973 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); A. AmsrMaIAs, supra note 85, at § 241.
X75. See notes X50-53 and accompanying text.
X76. See note 171 supra.
X77. Compare this to the subpoena situation where the persistent objections of a subpoenaed
person invoke the grand jury's reevaluation of the items' true importance. See notes I45-47 supra
and accompanying text.
X78. See, e.g., United States v. McClard, 333 F. Supp. 158, 164-65 (E.D. Ark. 197x).
179. If the citizen chooses to resist official execution of a warrant, "[w]ithout the slightest
hesitation his doors would be broken down, he would be placed under arrest, and the desired
material would be seized." VonderAhe v. Howland, 5o8 F.,d 364, 373 ( 9 th Cir. 1974) (Ely, J.,
concurring and dissenting); see note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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the exclusionary rule-does not apply if the victim of the search is not also
the defendant 80 Even if subsequently indicted, the victim in most jurisdictions may not complain if the grand jury that issued the indictment asked
questions based on illegally seized evidence.' 8 ' And for the nonsuspect victim, lacking even the exclusionary rule's deterrent, the remedies are far from
ample" Particularly if the police act pursuant to a search warrant, even one
later found to be based upon erroneous or insufficient facts, the victim may
do little more than seek return of the items seized.8
The sparseness of information upon which the probable cause decision
is made, the absence of adversarial input before that decision sanctions incursions against press interests, the insensitivity toward those interests of
the substantive test for making the decision, and the weakness of after-thefact remedies if that decision is incorrectly made withhold from press interests precisely the safeguards that the Supreme Court normally requires in
first amendment situations.' Those characteristics of the search warrant are
i8o. Compare Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), with People v. Martin, 45
Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). See also Amsterdam, supra note x6, at 36o-6i.
x81. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (i974).
182. People v. Warburton, 7 Cal. App. 3d 815, 824, 86 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899 (2d Dist. 2970), used
precisely this logic to refuse to allow a criminal defendant to exclude material unconstitutionally
subpoenaed from another party, despite California's rule allowing the defendant to exclude material
unlawfully seized from a third party: "When police unjustifiably enter an office and seize papers,
privacy is irrevocably destroyed. But the issuance and service of a subpoena do not, by themselves,
invade the private papers of anyone. If the person having custody of the papers believes the subpoena is
defective . . . he may make a motion to quash the subpoena . . . or he may refuse to comply and
present his excuse when enforcement is attempted against him ....
283. See A. AMsrEaAm, supra note 85, at § 224. "Good faith" and "pursuant to official duty"
defenses completely immunize the magistrate from an action claiming violation of rights due to
a search. The same defenses virtually do the same to police officers. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554, 557, 1967); c. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 317 (1975). See also Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972). In addition,
litigants suing federal officers must meet the Sio,ooo amount in controversy requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (2970). See Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 360 nn.137-38.
284. First amendment due process, see note 165 and accompanying text, generally requires
that a judge with the aid of opposing counsel must decide whatever interests affected by governmental procedure are indeed protected under the first amendment, and must do so before or as soon
as possible after the infringement of those interests. If the interests are found protected, the infringement may not proceed, or must cease immediately. See Heller v. New York, 423 U.S. 483 (1973);
Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 243-44 n.6 (2968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In contrast to the subpoena process, the
probable standards for third party search warrants allow no prior (nor usually any) judicial or
adversarial consideration of whether the items sought deserve first amendment protection. This
immediate hearing rule, developed in obscenity cases, should be stricter with regard to press searches.
The seizure for evidence of one allegedly obscene book or film of which copies are available for continued dissemination has only slight first amendment impact. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483,
492-93 (2973). However, the moment police officers enter a press facility in search of confidential
information relating to criminal activity, severe first amendment impact has already occurred. From
that point on, whatever fear of disclosure informants had earlier felt will be enhanced. The police's
ability to intrude without any concomitant ability on the part of the source to receive renewed
assurances by the newsgatherer may cut off further source cooperation. See notes x9o-99 infra and
accompanying text. Justice Jackson fittingly noted the inconsistency of the normal search process
and the traditional protections available to first amendment interests: "We must remember, too,
that freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution
in that there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For example,
any effective interference with freedom of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires
a course of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go to the court and obtain
an injunction." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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also contrary to the protections available to the subpoenaed witness and relied on in striking the Branzburgbalance against the press. 8 ' In at least four
ways the search procedure more severely impinges upon press interests than
the subpoena procedure contested in Branzburg; this more severe impact
almost certainly tips the delicate balance 88 in favor of protection against
searches.
First, even the most assiduously legal procurement and execution of a
search warrant more severely invades the privacy of its intended recipient
than does a subpoena. A police officer executing a search warrant is in no
sense bound to the secrecy and quasi-judicial decorum of grand jury proceedings. An officer is, in fact, authorized to break, enter, and even ransack
when necessary, subjecting the affected citizen to whatever invasion of privacy that may entail.
Second, unlike the grand jury subpoenas at issue in Branzburg,the effects
of searches fall not only on newsgathering but also upon the media's editing
and disseminating functions. A search may severely disrupt the functioning
of the entire press facility for several hours. When the item sought is a letter
or photograph, ingress to files, desks, broadcast booths, or paste-up rooms
may be unavoidable. Newspapers in particular tend to accumulate notes,
back issues, and photographs. The presence of police officers rifling through
these files cannot but disrupt normal functions-functions that at many
press facilities continue around the clock. 8 This disruption not only impedes timely publication or broadcast but effectively exacts a fine or tax in
the amount of salaries of employees either made idle by or required to clean
up after the police officers.' 89 It also establishes a potentially discriminatory
penalty against any media concern likely to receive and feel obligated not
to disclose certain information.' Thus, not only does the search itself
x85. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
x86. See note 214 infra and accompanying text.
187. See United States v. Doe, 405 F.2d 436, 438 (2d Cir. x968).
188. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at io, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal
docketed, No. 74-3212, 9th Ci., Nov. 2o, 1974, quoting affidavit of CBS News Director Gordon
Manning: "To allow this kind of free-wheeling search [like the one of the Stanford Daily offices] is
to invite more searches, since a working newsroom contains an abundance of information, much
Not only would these news gathering
of which would be argued by investigators to be useful . ...
and reporting functions be inhibited in an exaggerated but a similar way to which the subpoena
power inhibits, but also the very ability of a news organization to operate would be threatened.
A search warrant presumes that material must be sifted before the needed material is located. I can
imagine the working of a newsroom being brought to a complete halt while this voluminous and
as yet unorganized information is 'searched.'"
i89. Note, for example, that the search of KPFK-FM in Los Angeles lasted over 8 hours. 6 PCN
at 30, supra note i. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 (N.D. Cal. x972), appeal
docketed, No. 74-3212, 9th Cir., Nov. 20, 1974; 86 HAzv. L. Rzv. 1317, 1333 (1973); cf. Murasky,
supra note 27, at 862-64.
19o. of course, only the journalists' refusal (or inability) immediately to produce the item
named in the warrant triggers a disruptive search. Yet the tendency of members of the press in
the past to refuse to disclose confidential information, even after cited for contempt, suggests that
in most cases the police will be forced to search the premises. See Murasky, supra note 27, at
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disrupt media functions, but the mere threat of a search may affect newsgathering and editorial policy."'
Third, the detrimental effect of searches upon newsgathering far outstrips the harm that Justice White found "consequential but uncertain" in
Branzburg.' Unlike the subpoena situation, the reporter's loyalty to his
informant is meaningless in the face of a search; should the reporter block
the search, the police will force him aside. While legally bound to confine
their search to items specified, police officers have access to material in almost any file once the news office refuses simply to hand over the item
named in the warrant 9 The officers' scrutiny may blanket any portion of
the named location where the specified items might reasonably be located
-a limitation that allows virtually free access to the entire premises if the
item sought is small and easily capable of concealment 9 Moreover, in the
course of that authorized scrutiny, the officers may inadvertently discover
other unspecified, incriminating evidence. The officers may seize any evidence of criminal activity properly named in the warrant and any items inadvertently found in the authorized search 9 Anyone whose name or whose
confidential information-whether at all related to the particular matter being investigated-might be in one of those files will justifiably fear exposure.' Under similar circumstances, courts have been reluctant to leave the
degree of first amendment infringement to the "whim" of "zealous officers."' 97 Police discretion is particularly troublesome here since its impact is
measured by the reactions of people especially unlikely to trust law enforcement personnel to restrain their searches' 8 Justice White downgraded first
858 n.94 (study showing 96% refusal by journalists to obey court orders to reveal confidential
information).
191. These effects, not found in Branzburg,have provoked judicial prohibition of the offending
procedure in other cases. Merely by imposing extra "cost in printing and composing time and
materials," a Florida right-to-reply law, while itself supportive of other free expression rights, was
deemed an unconstitutional burden upon the press. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256 (1974). The threat to the press created by the potentially high costs of libel awards has also
motivated court restrictions. Compare Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), with New
York Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Furthermore, courts have held that the greater the impact
of governmental advertising regulations on publishers and editors, the less likely it is that they
will withstand judicial scrutiny. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
192. 408 U.S. at 700, 709.
193. Thus when searching for a one-page document or a photograph, the police must read

or examine every document or photograph in the office until they find the specified one.
194. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
X95. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-70 (1971); see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden,

387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967) (proper to search for weapon in washing machine and to seize
clothes found there though not originally sought).
196. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 8o YtaL

L.J. 317 (1970).

197. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. zo,
13 (1948); see Marcus v. A Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (196z). Note also Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938), which found unconstitutional an ordinance limiting legal distribution of literature on city streets by a licensing scheme because it left the decision to issue a license totally in the
City Manager's descretion. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 3X2 U.S. 569 (194). Similar unbounded
executive discretion characterizes the execution of search warrants.
198. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
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amendment impact of subpoenas in Branzburgbecause they do not "require
the press ... indiscriminately to disclose" its sources;... searches, on the

other hand, open the press' files wide.
Fourth, lower courts have accepted Justice Powell's balancing test as
authoritative. If they are correct in doing so, present search procedures are
insufficiently protective of the freedoms at stake. The two-part probable
cause test200 for a search warrant ignores competing societal and press interests, the relative weights of which Justice Powell claims should
decide
21
the government's right to information in the hands of the press. '
The importance of search warrants in accomplishing governmental
goals. Balanced against the search warrant's more detrimental impact on
press interests are those occasional governmental interests that only the warrant can serve. On the one hand, warranted searches do not play a statistically important role in criminal investigations. Whenever possible police
officers eschew warrants: they are utilized in less than io percent of all
searches and then usually in the prosecution of crimes, especially vice, unlikely to result in press involvement. 2 And police have at their disposal
Judgment at 14, Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed,
No. 74-3212, 9th Cir., Nov. 2o, 1974, quoting CBS commentator Walter Cronkite: "Included in
news material which is not broadcast . . .is information obtained in confidence or under restrictive
conditions from sources that would perhaps be of particular interest to the police, the FBI, or other
governmental agencies. It has been my experience that exposure, for whatever reason, of such unpublished information would have the chilling effect of cutting off that source in the future. Further,
once a practice has been established that threatens such exposure, the knowledge would have a chilling effect on all other sources which might prefer to remain anonymous . . . .While the potential
of such a chilling effect is great when more common tools such as the subpoena power are used,
the 'fishing expedition' nature of a search warrant makes it a particularly dangerous threat."
199. 408 U. S. at 682.
200. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 2o9-io supra and accompanying text. The use of search warrants directed solely
to the underground press, see note 3 supra, raises additional first amendment questions not present
in Branzburg. In that case, Justice White voiced a concern-which has prompted him elsewhere to
disagree with press protection afforded by his colleagues-that in many cases the press "has at its
disposal powerful mechanisms" to protect itself from government intrusion without judicial help.
408 U.S. at 7o6; see Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (i974) (White, J., dissenting); cf.
G. TAL=.sE, THE KsNDOM AND rM PowER (197). In Branzburg, where Justice White viewed the
effects of that intrusion as uncertain, the powerful and established press was thought to need no
protection. Admittedly, the New York Times survived the loss of reporter Caldwell's contact with
the Black Panthers resulting from the Court's refusal to privilege the reporter. Such would not
likely be the case with a struggling underground newspaper. Insofar as searches, unlike subpoenas,
have discriminatorily concentrated on the dissident press, and insofar as the former procedure may
cause more severe physical disruption than the latter, the continued allowance of searches poses a
greater threat to the free flow of ideas than do subpoenas. Surely the Court that was indignant at the
effect of a $5oo,ooo libel judgment against the Times, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) would be no less so at what amounts to greater impositions on the "radical press"
facilities most likely to suffer a search. Victims of press searches may represent dissident political
viewpoints and serve, as well as provide, media access to similarly dissident groups; a search's ability
to cripple these operations represents insufferable first amendment consequences. See id. at 294
(Black, J., concurring); cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
202. See DETEctO. OP Csaar,
supra note 97 at 99-104. This work notes that the "search
warrant is rarely used by police even since the Supreme Court expressed its preference for it." Id. at
zoo. The most common uses of warrants is in the prosecution of vice (narcotics, alcohol, gambling,
prostitution), and only then when (a) there is "an overriding desire by police to conduct a search
which courts will hold to be lawful" (b) and usually then only "when the desire is to search several
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myriad alternative means of obtaining significant amounts of information

-observation, surveillance, "tips," informers, access to public records, as
well as interrogations of victims, third parties and suspects. 2"'
On the other hand, in rare cases police do depend upon warranted

searches."° When swift action is necessary to acquire evidence, and its possessor will not cooperate, police may have to resort to a search. Alternatively
they may apply to a grand jury or prosecutor for a subpoena but that process

is often time-consuming.2 " Thus, when the police, despite criminal laws
prohibiting00 and court orders restraining 0 . such activity, fear imminent
destruction of crucial evidence, a search may be imperative. 8 Only in this

case does the search become as "essential" to criminal investigation as the
Supreme Court in Branzburgfound the grand jury subpoena always to be. " '
However, the search procedure never rises to the level of importance assigned to the subpoena in facilitating evidence-gathering by the courts. As

discussed earlier, enforcing the duty of citizens to provide information is a
major means by which legislative and administrative agencies and especially
courts and grand juries acquire evidence.210 The subpoena power (a power

usually withheld from law enforcement officials) statutorily endorses this
information-gathering effort. 11 Consequently government agencies in most
jurisdictions count on grand jury subpoenas rather than searches or other
police activity to bring evidence and witnesses before them. Moreover, the

corollary to a witness' duty to testify and produce tangible evidence is the
government's obligation to minimize the burden on the individual of testifying."2 The fact that a search imposes more of a burden by intruding more
drastically on the citizen's privacy than a subpoena argues for less emphasis

in the search situation on the citizen's testimonial duty. Indeed, while the
maxim that the court is entitled to every person's testimony continues to be
rooms or floors, or several buildings simultaneously." Id. at iol. By far most searches accompany
arrest rather than proceed by search warrants. Id. at 105. Yet whatever the importance to criminal
investigation of searches incident to arrest in general, they are virtually irrelevant to the press
searches under consideration here because normally no one associated with the press facility is
implicated in crime. Other legal alternatives to a search pursuant to a warrant, including the consent search, search of vehicles, search of state-licensed premises, border searches, and stop-and-frisk
are also irrelevant in the press search situation. See Amsterdam, supra note 16, at 358-60.
203. DETEaoN OF CRiME, supra note 97, at 3-4; E. ELnEFONsO, A. COFFEY & J. Sm.,LwLN,
PoLIcE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 62 (1972).

204. See note 3 supra; notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 158-61 supra and accompanying text.
2o6. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 135, 152.

207. See, e.g., Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969); Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 74-3212, 9th Cir.,
Nov. 20, 1974.
2o8. See 86 HAtv. L. Rav. 1317, 1330-31 (1973).
209. 408 U.S. at 688.
210. See notes 99-oo supra and accompanying text.

211. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
212. See note io2 supra and accompanying text.
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a favored rationale for curtailing claims of testimonial privilege, a contrary
impulse has characterized the judicial treatment of search and seizure.!13
D. Conclusion:A New Balancingof Interests
Composed of neutral citizens, the grand jury acts in a deliberative environment under judicial supervision. Reporters, like other witnesses, may

enlist the court's supervisory assistance to forestall the grand jury's undue interference with press interests. By threatening recourse to the courts, the witness may force the grand jury into reassessing the evidentiary value to it of
the journalist's testimony, even if a formal judicial balance would not favor
the reporter. When the balance does tip for the journalist, his interests are
protected before the government body invades them. And even when forced
to testify, the reporter can encourage continued source confidence with
promises not to reveal information or to reveal as little as possible.
Search and seizure, on the other hand, has no procedural mechanism
that guarantees as full a consideration of the interests involved before action
is taken. The probable cause requirement may make it somewhat more difficult to obtain a warrant than to activate a subpoena, although even this
proposition is doubtful given magisterial reliance upon police affidavits.
Nevertheless, once the warrant is issued, nothing can restrain its operation
until it has overrun whatever press interests stand in its way. If the search
proves legal, the victim has no way to remedy or ameliorate the damage to
press interests-interests that the magistrate and police never consider
when authorizing and executing the search. If the search proves to be illegal,
the victim, especially if not implicated in crime, has inadequate remedies
for the vast damage searches cause to the operation of a press facility and its
newsgathering activities.
Cases since Branzburghave determined that the balance of press and
government interests in that decision was close; only in instances "few in
number to be sure" must threatened first amendment values yield. 1 The
preceding analysis indicates that Branzburg's delicate balance in favor of
government interests does not control the search question. Branzburg deals
only with the "uncertain" effect on newsgatheringof the refusal of the viewer of a crime even to appear to testify. On the other hand, searches usually are
resorted to when evidence sought is second hand and tangible, rather than
eyewitness and testimonial. Moreover, the constant threat of a search affects editing and dissemination and clearly inhibits the press' newsgathering functions prior to any demand that a reporter testify. These circum233. Compare 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, at § 2192, with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
214. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966

(1973).
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stances dictate greater press protection from searches than may be appropriate in the case of subpoenas.
In addition, since a search warrant permits executive law enforcement
officials to trample the first amendment interests at stake before the press
has a chance to plead its case, it is entirely inconsistent with the procedural
fastidiousness upon which the Court usually insists in first amendment situations and that it found in Branzburg in the case of press subpoenas. And
searches not only inhibit a wider array of first amendment interests, they
also involve graver infringements of reporters' fourth amendment privacy
interests.216
Finally, the government interests pulling in the opposite direction are
clearly less vital than in the subpoena situation. In most, if not all, cases the
grand jury subpoena serves a much more significant societal role in the
prosecution of crime than does search and seizure. The former, additionally,
is perhaps the most important instance in which the duty of every person to
produce available evidence is applied to protect the integrity of society's
dispute-solving mechanism. That duty is virtually irrevelant in the search
and seizure situation.
Branzburg v. Hayes.1 does not settle the constitutionality of press
searches. In fact, the comparison of interests in that case with the governmental and press interests affected by search and seizure of media illustrates
the need for different standards than those laid down in Branzburg to protect newsrooms from these more drastic police intrusions. It is to a discussion of those new standards that the next section is devoted.
III. A NEw RULE

OR MNDIA SEARCIER

Since both privacy and free press interests are at stake in media searches,
two doctrinal approaches are available for assuring needed protection-one
based on the fourth amendment and the other on the first amendment. Each
approach is encumbered by a package of troubling questions.
215. The courts have recognized the search's comparative potential for violence to individual
privacy interests on the one hand, and the subpoena's potential for judicial protection on the other,
when deciding whether and how to extend fourth amendment protection to subpoenas. In the face
of the practical, procedural and judicial restraints on subpoenas, the Supreme Court in Hale v.
Henkel, 2oi U.S. 43 (19o6), applied weak fourth amendment protections to certain uses of the
subpoena. See notes x51-52 supra and accompanying text. One concurring Justice argued that even
those are unnecessary given the high degree of intrusiveness that the fourth amendment permits
in "reasonable" searches and seizures. Id. at 8o-S (McKenna, J., concurring); see United States
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10-12 (x973); People v. Warburton, 7 Cal. App. 3d 815, 86 Cal. Rptr.
894 (2d Dist. 1970) (described in note 182 supra).
216. 408 U.S. 665 (972). This analysis suggests that replacement of the subpoena with the
search warrant should change the balance struck in Branzburg by Justice White. Yet Justice White's
opinion may not be the law even as to the circumstances involved in Branzburg. The "controlling"
Powell concurrence, as interpreted in subsequent lower and state court adjudication, suggests standards
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A. A FourthAmendment Approach
Confronted with a challenge to the legality of a police search of a university newspaper, Judge Peckham in Stanford Daily v. Zurcherm
" found
considerable protection from press searches in the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.218 This case held for
the first time that availability of the less intrusive subpoena makes unreasonable the government's alternative use of a search to obtain evidence in
the hands of persons not implicated in crime. The fact that those persons
were also members of the press was not essential to this holding.
The standards Judge Peckham set countenanced such "third party"
searches only when a subpoena is "impractical.""21 In so doing, Judge Peckham suggested that the fourth amendment has always implicitly recognized the differential impact of search and subpoena and has justified the
use of searches under the traditional probable cause standards-that is, probable cause to believe that the item sought is in the specified location and that
it is related to the specified crime-only when there is a nexus to the crime
of the item's owner.Absent that nexus, the court held, a new probable cause
standard applies. While Judge Peckham's conclusion that parties not implicated in crime deserve special protection from searches has intuitive appeal, each aspect of his fourth amendment rationale poses problems.22
Judge Peckham justifies greater safeguards for victims of third party
searches by analogizing to the special protections accorded to arrested witnesses under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 ' However, the rules
regarding arrest of material witnesses not only have questionable constitutional mandate,222 but they are also improperly analogized to the search
more protective of newspersons and especially incapable of accommodation by the search warrant
process. See notes 109-14 & 122 supra and accompanying texts.
217. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed,
No. 74-3212, 9th Cir., Nov. 20, 1974. See 86 HARv. L. REv. 1317, 1319-23 (i973) for a critique
of this portion of the decision.
218. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
219. 353 F. Supp. at 127, 232. While this test did not depend upon the identity of the third
party, Judge Peckham added a somewhat more difficult test for issuing press search warrants requirng proof that destruction is imminent and a restraining order useless. Id. at 135.
220. Note that no court in California, the only state where a criminal defendant may suppress
evidence illegally seized from a third party, has ever suggested that a nonsuspect search is automatically illegal.
221. Fan. R. Csmua P. 4 6(b).
222. Compare Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (implying a fourth amendment basis for federal statutory protection of incarcerated witnesses), with United States ex rel.
Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 99x (2d Cir. z974) (leaving undecided whether the fourth amendment
requires the federal witness incarceration rules) and 86 HMv. L. REv. 2317, 1319-20 (2973) (arguing against a constitutional basis for 46(b)). See also Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279
U.S. 597, 6r8 (1929) setting an apparently lesser constitutional standard ("suspicion") than rule
46(b)'s standard ("probable cause") as to witness' probable flight, for legal incarceration of a witness. If the standards set in the federal statutes are constitutionally mandated and apply to the states,
the procedures for dealing with third party arrestees in all states are probably unconstitutional. See
Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness, 55 IowA L. REv. 1 (1969).
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and seizure context 23 because constitutional law traditionally has not
equated the criteria for permissible searches with those for arrests 2
Furthermore, the identity of the owner of the evidence historically has
not determined the availability of search warrants.2 Rather, probable cause
to believe that material related to criminal activity is on the premises (perhaps unknown to its owner) suffices to allow police entrance by warrant.2
Nor is a search of the premises occupied by persons implicated in crime less
intrusive than a third party search. It might be argued that at least suspected possessors of stolen or illegal property have a lesser expectation of
privacy concerning it, since they have no legal claim to ownership. Nonetheless, the failure of established constitutional doctrines to distinguish between searches of suspects' and nonsuspects' premises is sound. It acknowledges that the privacy interests of individuals should not rise or fall according to the allegations of police. From one viewpoint it may say that nonsuspects are given no greater protection than suspects, but from the other side it
asserts that even alleged wrongdoers are guaranteed all the rights of other
citizens until proven guilty. This premise is too central to our judicial tradition to allow room for varying levels of privacy rights based on allegations
of criminality, no matter how intuitively appealing that notion may be 2"
223. The fourth amendment provides different protections for victims of arrests and searches.
Judge Peckham notes, however, that with respect to suspects, the arrest standards are generally less
stringent than those protecting search victims and argues from there that the arrest requirements for
nonsuspect, material witnesses should at least form the baseline for third party searches. 353 F. Supp.
at 33o. But this conclusion does not necessarily follow. The standards for arrest of persons suspected
of crime must be understood in light of the other protections available to the suspect, e.g., the right
of counsel and the right to withhold evidence by remaining silent. Aggregating all of the protections
in the Bill of Rights, the arrested suspect receives much greater constitutional protection than the
search victim. Furthermore, the non-fourth amendment protections are inoperative in the case of the
incarcerated nonsuspect. For example, such an arrestee does not have the right to an attorney or to
a statement of the right to remain silent, even though such "witnesses" are often held until sufficient
evidence accumulates to charge them with a crime. See Carlson, supra note 222; c. United States
ex rel. Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1974). Arguably, therefore, the federal law merely
substitutes statutory protection of nonsuspects at the stage of arrest for the unavailable fifth and
sixth amendment protections of arrested suspects. There is no evidence that the Constitution compels
this compensatory protection. But even assuming otherwise, the third party search victim may not
warrant similar compensatory protection since he already enjoys as much protection from unreasonable
searches as does the suspect whose premises are searched (except for the exclusionary rule, which
Judge Peckham's test still denies to the victims of third party searches).
224. See 86 HAxv. L. REv. 1317, 1320-21 (1973).
225. See United States v. McClard, 333 F. Supp. X58 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (search valid, though
search warrant did not name the owner of the searched premises); 86 HAv. L. REv. 1317, 132o-21.
226. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (3967): The law merely requires a "nexus . . .
between the item to be seized and criminal behavior," that is, "probable cause . . . to believe that
the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." This requires no more
than "consideration of police purposes."
227. The contours of Judge Peckham's test are also problematic. For example, he never defines
a third party. To carry out a search, must there be probable cause to believe not only that criminal
evidence exists on certain premises, but also that its owner (occupier, possessor, or a trespasser?)
committed a (particular?) crime? Or would mere suspicion suffice? If the former test applies, judge
Peckham has succeeded in making a three-part probable cause standard (relationship of items to
crime, location of item, and criminality of item's possessor) out of what has always been a two-part
probable cause test (nexus of object to crime and location of object), i.e., in making every search
warrant also an arrest warrant. Traditionally, however, courts have insisted that at least the past
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Judge Peckham's most persuasive argument follows a "less drastic alternatives" rationale,"' applied to the fourth amendment apparently for the
first time. Because there exists a well-established, traditionally favored evidence-gathering alternative-the subpoena-the least restrictive alternatives
doctrine avoids a common pitfall when striking a procedure for not being
the least restrictive one possible: the courts' need to legislate the better alternative."' Nonetheless, this theory too seems troublesome. First, the constitutional vitality of the least restrictive alternatives test may be in doubt."0
Moreover, a subpoena is always less drastic than a search, yet Judge Peckham
does not explain why only nonsuspect third parties should have the protection of this less intrusive procedure. He may be assuming that a criminal
suspect is more likely than a third party to destroy evidence, necessitating
a search and seizure. Not only is this rationale based on a questionable
behavioral assumption; in addition it increases the importance of proving
the probable nexus of the owner to criminal activity before ever obtaining
a warrant and the problems attendant upon doing so."3' These factors
illustrate the difficulties in extending the less restrictive alternatives test to
any criminal procedure.
Although Judge Peckham premised his elevated fourth amendment
standard primarily on the nonsuspect status of the search victim, he also
bolstered that argument with reference to Stanford Daily's status as a newspaper. 2 2 Just as the fourth amendment recognizes especially intense privacy
interests surrounding the home and particularly the bedroom because of
other fundamental rights centered there,' itarguably should provide special protection from governmental intrusion for those places where other
fundamental freedoms-such as freedom of the press-normally reside.
This approach would avoid the troubling distinction between privacy rights
or reputed criminality of the possessor is irrelevant to the determination of a search warrant's propriety.
See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. o3 (1964). If mere suspicion of having committed a crime suffices,
Judge Peckham's rule adds little to the old probable cause test since most possessors of criminal items,
without more, are suspect.
228. 353 F. Supp. at 130.

229. See Gunther, Reflections on Robel: It's Not What the Court Did But the Way that It Did It,
20 STAN. L. Rav. 1140, 1147-48 (x968); 86 Hauv. L. Rav. 1317, 1321-23 (1973).
23o. In the past, only first amendment interests have benefited from the requirement of the

least oppressive alternative. Justice White in Branzburg even refused to extend the analysis from
those first amendment cases in which it has applied in the past to new first amendment situations,
suggesting a retreat from the doctrine. 408 U.S. at 68o-8i, 699-7oo; see Murasky, supra note 27,
at 875.
231. It may be difficult to link specific persons to specific crimes in the early stages of an
investigation
and without first seizing evidence of criminal activity. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8
U.S. 66 5,70X-02 (1972). Otherwise the search warrant would be a redundancy given the legality
of and police preference for the arrest warrant. See note 202 supra.
232. 353 F. Supp. at 133-35.See note 219 supra.
233. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital bedroom). Compare Stanley

v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (certain obscenity laws invalid when enforced [in this case, using
search and seizure] against possession of obscene material solely in the home), with United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (2973) (valid to apply a similar federal law to transportation of similar obscene
material from one home to another).
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of suspects and nonsuspects at the heart of Judge Peckham's special rule for
third party searches. But it still would involve a troubling new doctrine in
fourth amendment common law: the notion that the fourth amendment offers multiple-tiered protections depending on the character of the search victim." 4 Before embracing a concept with such far-reaching implications,
courts should consider whether an analysis based on established first amendment doctrines, rather than on this new view of the fourth amendment,
will not offer sufficient protection for the press.
B. A First Amendment Approach
i. Defining the extent of protection.
Judge Peckham's approach may be criticized for introducing into fourth
amendment doctrine two potentially upsetting new elements-least restrictive alternative analysis and multiple-level protection based on the search
victim's nonsuspect status. However, the rule he announced to regulate
searches of media can be based on established first amendment doctrine
without muddying the waters of fourth amendment theory. Thus, instead
of stressing the special privacy interests of nonsuspect third parties, courts
might consider the special first amendment interests of newsgathering,
editing, and dissemination. Similarly, whereas least restrictive alternative
analysis is alien to fourth amendment theory, it frequently has been enlisted
in first amendment cases."' Assuming for the moment that a first amendment analysis can support Judge Peckham's rule, one still should consider
whether it assures the press adequate and properly fitting protection from
police searches.
Judge Peckham's rule would authorize magistrates to issue warrants for
searches of the press upon a clear showing of the imminent destruction of
crucial evidence and of the futility of a restraining order to prevent that
destruction."' Given the ex parte nature of warrant applications... and the
deference traditionally given police requests, " ' there is considerable risk
even under this tough standard that press searches will be abused, especially
since this test still makes damage actions for improper searches difficult to
win." Since other remedies are ineffectual,,4 courts faced with this possi234. The Supreme Court has afforded certain intimate localities greater fourth amendment protection, see cases cited supra note 233, because expectations of privacy there are greater than elsewhere. This rationale rests those decisions on traditional fourth amendment doctrine, see note 8
supra and accompanying text, rather than on untried notions regarding the character of the owners of
searched premises.
235. But cf. note 230 supra; notes 248-49 infra and accompanying text.
236. 353 F. Supp. at 135.
237. See notes 173-74 supraand accompanying text.
238. See notes 169-74 supra and accompanying text.
239. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
240. See note 18o-83 supra and accompanying text.
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bility may decide that the general threat to first amendment values outweighs the general state interest in obtaining those items of evidence alleged
to be in danger of destruction by the media, and that this balance of interests
justifies a per se rule forcing police to secure evidence from the press by
subpoenas, never by searches.
In support of this conclusion, it can be argued that if a newspaper in fact
would prefer to destroy evidence and face criminal charges or contempt
rather than comply with a subpoena, it also probably would take precautions
against having that evidence seized by a surprise search." 1 If so, a police
raid would be far more likely to harm legitimate press functions and harass
the newspaper staff than it would be to net the evidence sought. Moreover,
this per se rule would avoid introducing novel standards into traditional
search and seizure proceedings and make the magistrate's authorization
and police officer's execution of a warrant so clearly illegal as to remove
good faith defenses in suits against the officials for illegal searches.
Although the "imminent destruction of evidence" test proposed by
Judge Peckham may not withstand careful scrutiny, there is one exception
to the no-search rule that seems necessary. If media premises are rendered
immune from police entry, it is possible that persons engaged in crime
will try to conceal evidence by handing it over to sympathetic members of
the press."4 ' This risk could be alleviated by permitting third party media
searches only on a showing of probable cause to believe that specified
instrumentalities of crime or contraband will be found on the premises. The
standard draws a clear line that is familiar to magistrates2 3 and rests on
established first amendment principles ;244 rarely will a source-or an issuing
243.

See notes 70 & 142 supraand accompanying texts.

242. What, for example, if a member of the "Symbionese Liberation Army" had turned over

to the press the alleged Marcus Foster murder weapon, rather than merely a letter taking credit for
that slaying? See note 3 supra.
243. Until 1967, the fourth amendment only allowed searches for contraband or instrumentalities; "mere" circumstantial evidence was immunized. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967),
abolished the mere evidence rule generally, although it has since been resurrected in selected circumstances. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), which laid down a rule
illegalizing the seizure of any anticipated items not named in a warrant but found in "plain view"
during an otherwise legal search, unless the items are "contraband [or] stolen goods [or] dangerous
in themselves." Id. at 471.
244. In a x973 obscenity search and seizure case, Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (3973),
the Supreme Court noted: "The seizure of instruments of a crime, such as a pistol or a knife, or
'contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves' . . . are to be distinguished from
quantities of books and movie films when a court appraises the reasonableness of the seizure under
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment standards." Id. at 502, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 471 (3973). Roaden is one of a long line of cases, see, e.g., Heller v. New York, 4x3
U.S. 483 (1973) and A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964), that find in first amendment "due process," see note 165 supra, a requirement that searches of movie houses and bookstores for
allegedly pornographic material must be preceded or closely followed by adversarial adjudication of
the question of the material's illegality. In the passage quoted, Roaden excepted from that rule any
search of a movie house or bookstore involving the seizure of contraband and criminal instrumentalities. Coolidge and Roaden suggest that at the margin of permissible searches society's interest in
obtaining contraband or criminal instrumentalities tips the balance in favor of seizure. On the other
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magistrate-not know if an item is contraband, stolen or an instrument of
crime. Therefore, immunity from search, while qualified, will have minimal
dampening effects on sources. And the test's clear line will enable magistrates to withhold warrants in most cases where legally required: illegal
searches generally would have to be warrantless and subject to damages
suits more immune from good faith defenses. This test has the virtue of
allowing police access to items that actually contributed to criminal activity,
for example, a murder weapon, while immunizing from search and seizure
items whose sole purpose is to inform, for instance, a letter explaining a
slaying. To assure fuller protection, the rule could be coupled with a prohibition against police authorization to seize unspecified, additional evidence during the course of the search."'
Selecting a doctrinal approach.
A court reaching this balance of interests would have two analytical
approaches for doing so. The first is the traditional "compelling state
interest" test; the second is more explicit balancing.
The traditionaltest. Although Branzburg used the traditional approach
to uphold the government's subpoena of reporters against their claims of
first amendment privilege,"" that case does not necessarily control a similar
analysis of searches. As demonstrated in Part II, additional press interests
are jeopardized by searches of the media, and the intrusion on those interests
is also more severe than with the subpoena procedure. Thus, the government
interests found compelling in Branzburg arguably are not overriding in the
search context. It is not clear, however, that the traditional test (which
claims to eschew balancing) takes account of varying levels of first amendment interests. 47 If not, then a state interest found compelling in one case
would seem to override all first amendment claims in future cases.
Even when the state's goals are found compelling, however, some first
amendment cases have required the government to use the least restrictive
means to reach those goals. Under this doctrine, courts could still require
police to use subpoenas as a less intrusive means of securing media-held
2.

hand, the balance tips against the seizure of less important, circumstantial evidence. This principle
holds true although the victim of either search has the same privacy interest.
245. Such a rule would be an exception to the traditional rule that police may seize unanticipated items in "plain view" relating to criminal activity. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 464-72 (1971).
246. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700-o (1972).
247. Actually, justice Whites approach in Branzburg may resemble balancing more than the
"compelling state interest" approach. While devoting only two brief passages to the latter doctrine,
408 U.S. at 68o-8i, 700-01, Justice White discusses at great length the "important role" of the
grand jury in criminal investigation, id. at 687, and the "essential" support provided that body by
the subpoena, id. at 688. To this is compared the "consequential, but uncertain" effect of grand
jury subpoenas, id. at 69o-9i, on constitutionally protected newsgathering. Id. at 707. Justice Whites
conclusion is that "the public interest in law enforcement" is sufficient "to override" the negative
press effects. Id. at 69o-9i.
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evidence, even while recognizing a compelling state interest in finally
acquiring that evidence. However, two snags flaw this reasoning. First,
where no viable alternative exists, search warrants would have to be permitted in order to effectuate the state's purpose. Thus, police might be able
to seek warrants upon a showing of imminent destruction of evidence or
the reporter's announced vow to resist subpoenas. At any rate, the uncertainty engendered by this "no alternative" loophole would invite test
searches at least initially, and perhaps for some time, injurious to first
amendment values.
Second, Justice White in Branzburg explicitly ruled out reliance on
"least restrictive alternative" analysis in the subpoena context 4 8 because he
2 9 In reply, it can be argued
felt it invites "legislative" decisionmaking.
that Justice White erred in holding this analysis inapplicable. " Alternatively, one might try to distinguish Branzburgon the ground that subpoenas
would require novel alternatives, whereas search warrants have an existing
alternative-the subpoena itself.
Balancing.The web of difficulties inhering in the traditional, two-tiered
analysis is avoided by a more flexible balancing approach. Balancing permits
the court to weigh the different intensities of first amendment interests in
the subpoena and search situations, rather than being bound by a prior
determination that the state's interest is compelling and therefore forever
overriding. Moreover, it supports scrutiny of feasible alternatives in the
context of weighing the intensity of the government's interests in securing
evidence. For example, a court might find the government's need for information is the stronger interest where no alternatives to a search are
available, but not otherwise.
The major criticism levelled against balancing is that it spawns ad hoc
decisionmaking based on the judges' personal values. While the traditional
test may be rigid, its supporters argue that at least it avoids the slippery
slope of subjective adjudication. However, Justice Powell's use of balancing
proves that principled adjudications are feasible."5' Over time, he has found
it increasingly possible to generalize the components of his first amendment
balancing and in this way terrace the adjudicative slope so that other judges
might follow his steps more easily.
Such adjudication by comparison of competing interests seems most
workable in the press search context given the nearly equal intuitive
Id. at 699-700.
249. Id. at 705-o6.
250. See Murasky, supra note 27, at 875-76.
251. See Gunther, supra note iii. Compare Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 85o-75
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting), with Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
248.
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strengths of the four interests involved. Proceeding from the assumption
that the decision in Branzburgcan be justified as the result of balancing, 2
this approach would justify greater press protections in the search situation
than that case required with subpoenas: compared to subpoenas, searches
more severely inhibit more first amendment and privacy interests, despite
searches' uncertain accomplishment of any governmental goals not served
by subpoenas. These differences should suffice to tip in the opposite direction
the close balance struck in Branzburg 53
IV. CONCLUSION

After journalists failed to secure complete protection from subpoenas in
Branzburg,they turned their attention to thus far unavailing attempts at
federal shield legislation."" The press has been more successful in advancing
their interests in state legislatures and lower federal and state courts. In
fact, the effectiveness of state shield legislation and of the holdings of state
and lower federal courts in blocking enforcement of press subpoenas
probably motivated the development of a new government means of acquiring information-the press search.
Nonetheless, the media may look to the same fora that have partially
shielded them from subpoenas for perhaps more complete protection from
searches. The 26 state shield laws, particularly if extended to other and
strengthened in all jurisdictions, offer a framework for sheltering the press
from searches, despite troublesome gaps in their language and jurisdictional
applicability, as well as in their availability prior to police intrusion. More
general constitutional protection is also available. The courts' willingness
to read Branzburgto immunize reporters from some subpoenas indicates
their likely receptiveness to even greater press immunity from searches,
because searches exaggerate the negative first amendment effects discussed
in Branzburgwithout a concomitant boost to governmental interests. Either
traditional "compelling state interest" doctrine or a balancing approach
more explicit justify the courts in achieving various degrees of protection
from media searches-including a per se ban as well as standards limiting
searches to certain journalists (for example, ones likely to destroy evidence)
or to certain kinds of evidence (for example, contraband and criminal instrumentalities).
In addition to illustrating the potential for, and pitfalls in, various statutory and constitutional routes to control media searches, the preceding analysis also suggests the virtue of press reliance for protection on the fluid scene
See note 247 supra.
253. See note 214 supra and accompanying text.
254. See note 20 supra.
252.
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presented by state legislatures and state and lower federal courts. While failure has marked efforts at federal legislation, and journalists' "gloom" greeted the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, the trend has been toward
greater protection in more local legislative and judicial arenas. The multiplicity of potential press protective theories and fora in which to advance
them allows the various voices of the press to advance their own, sometimes
inconsistent, needs on several different fronts. Not only does this multifaceted approach give all aspects of the media more significant input into
the law's development; in addition it makes each state legislature and each
state and lower federal court a laboratory in which "to remould, through
experimentation,"2 "8 the law and to better accommodate the competing
informational claims of the press, law enforcement officials and, ultimately,
the public.
James S. Liebman
255. See Goodale,supra note 27 at 133.

256. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

